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Notes
WHAT DOES "NO" MEAN IN PENNSYLVANIA? - THE
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION




In hearings on violence against women, members of the United States
Senate have declared instances of rape to be a national epidemic.1 In
1990, for the first time in United States history, the number of reported
rapes exceeded 100,000.2 Moreover, the FBI reported that the number of
rapes rose from ten per hour in 1989 to twelve per hour, approximately
300 per day, in 1990.3 At that time, these statistics indicated that the
United States led the world with its number and rate of reported rapes.4
These alarming records were broken again by the most recent data
available. In 1992, more than 109,000 women reported that they were
raped.5 Despite this shockingly high number, the FBI continues to list
rape as the most under-reported crime. 6 Indeed, statistics reveal that only
sixteen percent of the rapes that occurred in 1992 were reported to the
police. 7 Information obtained from state-wide rape crisis centers substan-
1. Violence Against Women: Victims of the System, 1991: Hearings on S.15 Before the
Committee on the Judiciaiy of the Senate, 102d Cong., 1st. Sess. 4, 22, 183 (1991) [here-
inafter Hearings] (opening statement of Sen. DeConcini, testimony of Sen. Dole
and introduction of majority staff report entitled Violence Against Women: The In-
crease of Rape in America 1990by Sen. Biden, Chairman, Senate Committee on the
Judiciary).
2. Id. at 189 (noting that rape epidemic is likely to worsen).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 193 (citing United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics Special Report, International Crime Rates, May 1988). The term "rape
number" refers to the number of rapes, while the term "rape rate" refers to the
percentage. of women who were raped. Id. at 189; see a/soJULIE A. ALLISON & LAW-
RENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, RAPE: THE MISUNDERSTOOD CRIME 9-19 (1993) (discussing
explanations for prevalence of rape in United States).
5. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1992 (1993).
6. See ALLISON & WRIGHTMAN, supra note 4, at 172 (discussing reasons for
under-reporting);JEANNE C. MARSH ET AL., RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW REFORM 28
(1982) (listing factors that enter into victim's decision to report rape).
7. NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER SURVEY, RAPE IN AMERICA (1992).
(193)
1
Scalo: What Does No Mean in Pennsylvania - The Pennsylvania Supreme Cour
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
tiates the assertion that the number of rapes reported to the police is
fewer than the number of rapes that actually occur.
8
The controversy surrounding rape begins with this statistical informa-
tion and pervades legal and social realms.9 The interrelationship between
rape and social attitudes is suggested by one feminist author's view that
"rape is an exercise in the imbalance of power that exists between most
men and women, a relationship that has forged the social order from an-
cient times on."10 Inevitably, these social attitudes and myths culminate in
the law.11 The tension between myth and reality and the controversy
about men and women's social roles affect every stage of a rape case's
progression through the legal system-from the victim's decision of
whether to report to the court's decision of whether to convict.12 Conse-
quently, the problems inherent in the legal system's approach to rape
have been coined the "second rape" because of the victims' feelings that
they "will be tried, battered and abused by the system."
1 3
Despite legislative reforms to remedy these feelings of injustice, some
courts continue to perpetuate rape myths and social inequalities between
8. Hearings, supra note 1, at 195. In two out of every three cases, the state-wide
rape crisis centers showed dramatically higher increases in the number of rapes
than the data provided by police. Id. The report highlights the importance of this
unofficial data noting that, "because the rape crisis center data is independent of
official rape reporting trends and because the data indicate that the rape rate is
rising at a pace even greater than that suggested by the Uniform Crime Reporting
system, we know that the surging epidemic is real." Id. at 196.
9. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 10 (1987) (noting that feminists, relying on
problem of under-reporting, declare that rape is at epidemic levels, while others
maintain that rape is relatively uncommon).
10. ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE: THE Ms. REPORT ON RECOGNIZ-
ING, FIGHTING, AND SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 21 (1988) (discussing
feminist author Susan Brownmiller's views on rape).
11. MARSH ET AL., supra note 6, at viii. Particularly, "legislative debate over
issues of marital rape, acquaintance rape, rape without other extensive physical
damage, and the relevance of the victim's sexual conduct tap basic-almost pri-
mordial-beliefs about the subservient place and role of women, sex, seduction
and fear." Id.
12. Id. at 85-102 (discussing influences on investigation, issuance of warrant
and prosecution of rape cases); The Response to Rape: Detours on the Road to Equal
Justice: A Majority Staff Report Prepared for the Use of the Committee on the Judiciary of the
Senate, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-13 (1993) [hereinafter Report] (discussing stumbling
blocks confronting victims in arrest, dismissal of cases, acquittal and sentencing,
and providing statistical information on each of these areas).
13. Report, supra note 12, at 8 (discussing judicial system's inadequacy with
regard to prosecution of attackers and quoting Violence Against Women: Victims of
the System, 1991: Hearings on S.15 Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate,
102d Cong., 1st. Sess. 137 (1991)); see LEE MADIGAN & NANCY C. GAMBLE, THE
SECOND RAPE: SOCIETY'S CONTINUED BETRAYAL OF THE VICTIM 7 (1991) ("The sec-
ond rape is exemplified most dramatically when the survivor is strong enough,
brave enough, and even naive enough to believe that if she decides to prosecute
her offender, justice will be done. It is a rape more devastating and despoiling
than the first.").
[Vol. 40: p. 193
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men and women when the courts interpret the law. 14 For example, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that a woman is not raped when a
man penetrates her despite her repeated and clearly-expressed lack of
consent in the controversial case Commonwealth v. Berkowitz.15 According
to the court, because Pennsylvania's rape statute does not contain a con-
sent element, consent is not relevant to the issue of force. 16
As a result of public discontent with the Berkowitz court's holding and
as part of a broad attempt to reform Pennsylvania's outdated rape law, the
Pennsylvania General Assembly has enacted a law that purports to remedy
14. See MARSH ET AL., supra note 6, at 49-65 (discussing impact of rape law
reform in courtroom).
15. 641 A.2d 1161, 1164 (Pa. 1994) (finding that complainant's testimony
failed to establish that appellee forcibly compelled her to engage in sexual
intercourse).
16. Id. at 1164 n.4 (defining "forcible compulsion" as requiring physical
force, threat of physical force, or psychological coercion). At the time of Berkowitz,
Pennsylvania's rape statute stated:
A person commits a felony of the first degree when he engages in sexual
intercourse with another person not his spouse:
(1) by forcible compulsion;
(2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a
person of reasonable resolution;
(3) who is unconscious; or
(4) who is so mentally deranged or deficient that such person is incapa-
ble of consent.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1994), amended by 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3121 (Supp. 1995).
While the court reversed Berkowitz's rape conviction, the court reinstated the
indecent assault conviction because the elements of indecent assault, indecent
contact and lack of consent, were met. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1166. At the time of
Berkowitz, Pennsylvania's indecent assault statute stated:
(a) Offense defined. - A person who has indecent contact with another
not his spouse, or causes such other to have indecent contact with him, is
guilty of indecent assault if:
(1) he does so without the consent of the other person;
(2) he knows that the other person suffers from a mental disease or de-
fect which renders him or her incapable of appraising the nature of his
or her conduct;
(3) he knows that the other person is unaware that an indecent contact is
being committed;
(4) he has substantially impaired the other person's power to appraise or
control his or her conduct by administering or employing, without the,
knowledge of the other drugs, intoxicants or other means for the pur-
pose of preventing resistance;
(5) the other person is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or
other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority
over him; or
(6) he is over 18 years of age and the other person is under 14 years of
age.
(b) Grading. - Indecent assault under subsection (a) (6) is a misde-
meanor of the first degree. Otherwise, indecent assault is a misdemeanor
of the second degree.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3126 (Supp. 1994), amended by 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3126 (Supp. 1995).
1995] NOTE
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the court's decision. 17 The "new" addition to the statutory scheme for
rape, the crime of sexual assault, makes nonconsensual intercourse a sec-
ond degree felony.18 While the media and legislature hail this statute as
the "'no means no' provision," a critical review of the statute suggests im-
perfections and unresolved issues that make its impact on rape and the
Berkowitz decision dubious.1 9
This Casenote discusses the development of rape law throughout the
country, focusing particularly on Pennsylvania law. As background, Part
II discusses the history of rape laws, the rape reform movement and the
impact rape reform has had on legislation and case law.2 0 Particularly,
Part II focuses on Pennsylvania's reformist efforts and the manifestations
17. See Hunter T. George II, Governor Signs New Rape Bill into Law, Drops Need to
Prove Forc HARRISBURG PATRIOT & EVENING NEWS, Apr. 1, 1995, at A3 (noting that
Governor Tom Ridge signed bill into law on Mar. 31, 1995 and describing law as
"sparked by a court decision last year that cleared an East Stroudsburg University
student of a rape conviction"). For a discussion of the new legislation and its im-
pact on the Berkowitz decision, see infra notes 18, 19, 126-28, 136-42, 183-206, 213-
15 and accompanying text.
18. The sexual assault statute provides: "Except as provided in section 3121
(relating to rape) or 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse), a
person commits a felony of the second degree when that person engages in sexual
intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant without the com-
plainant's consent." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124.1 (Supp. 1995) (effective May
31, 1995).
As a second-degree felony, a conviction under this statute carries a maximum
prison sentence of 10 years and a maximum fine of $25,000. Tanya Barrientos &
Lini S. Kadaba, The No-Means-No Bill Is Clear; Student Opinion Isn't, The Legislation
Would Strengthen Pa. 's Rape Laws. Many Students at Area Colleges Applaud the Changes.
Others Say Life Isn't That Simple., PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 28, 1995, at BI.
19. See, e.g., Robert Moran, No-Means-No Bill Sent to Governor, HARRISBURG PA-
TRIOT & EVENING NEWS, Mar. 22, 1995, at BI (referring to then-pending bill as the
"so-called no-means-no legislation"). In response to the new law, Delilah
Rumburg, executive director of the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape, re-
marked, "[niow victims that have been afraid to come forward will feel more se-
cure." George, supra note 17 at A3. Similarly, legislators have praised the law as
"'a major step forward.'" Russell E. Eshleman, Jr., Rape Bill Likely to Pass Today,
'The No Means No' Provision Is Expected to Win House Approval The Senate OKd It
Yesterday., PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 21, 1995, at 1 (quoting former State Representa-
tive Karen A. Ritter who directed House efforts to reform rape laws in 1994). Addi-
tionally, perhaps the most poignant evidence of the political reaction to this
legislation is that both the House and Senate unanimously passed the bill. Moran,
supra, at BI (also noting Governor Ridge's support).
For a further discussion of the sexual assault statute and other changes in the
statutory scheme for rape, see supra note 18 and infra notes 129-42 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of the potential problems and defects with the legisla-
tion, see infra notes 183-206, 213-15 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the history of rape laws and the impact of the rape
reform movement, see infra notes 29-38 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of rape laws in various states and cases implementing these laws, see infra notes 39-
80 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 40: p. 193
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of these efforts in pre-Berkowitz cases.21 Part III A discusses the facts and
procedural history of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case Commonwealth
v. Berkowitz.2 2 Part III A also discusses the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
rationale underlying its application of Pennsylvania's rape laws in the
Berkowitz case. 23 Part III B discusses the Pennsylvania State Legislature's
reaction to the Berkowitz decision, including the proposed legal reforms, as
well as the legislation that was finally enacted in March 1995.24 Part IV A
provides a critical analysis of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Berkowitz
decision and suggests that the court narrowly construed the rape laws and,
in doing so, undermined rape reform efforts.2 5 Part IV B critically ana-
lyzes the legislature's response and suggests that while the new law may be
a step forward, it leaves various issues unanswered and does not fully re-
solve the Berkowitz controversy. 26 Finally, Part V discusses the ramifications
that the Berkowitz decision and the new legislation will have on future rape
prosecutions and victims in the Commonwealth. 27 Part VI concludes that,
while the latest legislative action may be a step toward effectuating the
goals of rape reform, its impact on the Berkowitz decision is unclear and
will ultimately depend on the court's interpretation as it hears cases involv-
ing the new legislation.28
II. BACKGROUND-TRADITIONAL RAPE LEGISLATION AND CASE LAw
A. Traditional Rape Law and the Movement to Reform
For decades, rape laws in the United States were based on outdated
myths of rape promulgated by early seventeeth-century English jurists such
as Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale. 29 That the laws were geared to pro-
21. For a discussion of rape reform in Pennsylvania, see infra notes 39-47 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of Pennsylvania cases implementing these
laws, see infra notes 48-80 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the facts and procedural history of Berkowitz, see infra
notes 81-111 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of
the forcible compulsion element of rape in Berkowitz, see infra notes 112-15 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the relevance of lack of consent, see infra
notes 116-21 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the court's analysis of
indecent assault, see infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania Legislature's failed reform attempts
following the Berkowitz decision, see infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of the provisions of the new legislation and the changes it effectuates
in the law, see supra note 18 and infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
25. For a critical discussion of the court's analysis in Berkowitz, see infra notes
143-82 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of the defects in the new law and its dubious effect on the
Berkowitz decision, see infra notes 183-206, 213-15 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of the social and legal impact of the Berkowitz decision,
see infra notes 207-24 and accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the fate of Berkowitz in the wake of the legislature's
actions, see infra notes 183-206, 213-15 and accompanying text.
29. Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1223 n.11 (Pa. 1986) (noting
that Model Penal Code perpetuated many myths of rape).
1995] NOTE
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tect the accused man by portraying him as the actual victim is evident in
Hale's remark: "Rape is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be
proved, and harder still to be defended by the party accused, tho never so
innocent."30 This attitude resulted in rules that defined rape to require
proof of actual physical resistance by the victim and substantial force by
the accused. 3 ' Moreover, evidentiary rules that focused on the victim's
prior unchaste history penalized women who did not complain promptly
and required corroboration of the woman's testimony.3 2 Despite the
seeming injustice of these rules, they were supported by societal views and
norms.
33
30. MATTHEW HALE, 1 HisTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634 (London 1st
ed. 1736). This statement served as the basis for cautionary instructions to jurors.
ESTRICH, supra note 9, at 108 n.6. The Model Penal Code ascribes to this approach
in the following provision:
In any prosecution before ajury for an offense under this Article, the jury
shall be instructed to evaluate the testimony of a victim or complaining
witness with special care in view of the emotional involvement of the wit-
ness and the difficulty of determining the truth with respect to alleged
sexual activities carried out in private.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (1962).
Under this approach, the usual procedural guarantee that the government
must prove the man's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is turned upside down so
that "the one who so 'easily' charges rape, must first prove her own lack of guilt."
ESTRICH, supra note 9, at 5. The Pennsylvania General Assembly has rejected the
Model Penal Code's juror instruction requirement, as well as other rules that per-
petuate rape myths, like the prompt reporting and corroboration requirements.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101-07 (1983 & Supp. 1994), amended by 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 3101-02, 3105-06 (Supp. 1995). Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6
(requiring prompt complaint, corroboration, heightened scrutiny in jury evalua-
tion of victim's testimony and allowing evidence of victim's prior promiscuity as
defense) with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101-07 (eliminating prompt complaint,
corroboration, and resistance requirements, and disallowing evidence of victim's
prior sexual conduct as defense), amended by 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101-02,
3105-06 (Supp. 1995). Fortunately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also shares
the legislature's view that these rules are out-dated. See Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1223
n.11 (describing these rules as "ill-conceived").
31. ESTRICH, supra note 9, at 5.
32. Id.; see MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 (3)-(5) (allowing accused to use evi-
dence of victim's promiscuity as defense to rape, requiring prompt complaint and
requiring that victim's testimony be corroborated).
33. See In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1272 (NJ. 1992). Among these views was
the notion that men had a right to sex and that women were the property of their
husbands. Id. (noting that rape had its legal origins in laws designed to protect
male property rights); J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim
Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544, 546 (1980) (discussing
relationship between rape and male desire to protect his property); ESTRICH, supra
note 9, at 72-73 (discussing marital rape exemption's origin in stereotype of wife as
"permanent chattel"). Moreover, men believed women had rape fantasies about
being ravished by their lovers and that women would turn these fantasies into rape
accusations when they ultimately estranged from the relationship. ESTRUCH, supra
note 9, at 5.
[Vol. 40: p. 193
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As social, psychological and legal thinking began to change in the
1970s, the rape reform movement emerged. 34 The purpose of this move-
ment was to revise outdated rape laws "to reflect and legitimate the chang-
ing status of women in American societies" and to reject the patriarchal
view that men had a right to own women and treat them as sexual ob-
jects.3 5 The reformers' message stressed that rape is a crime of violence,
not sex. 36 The reformers goals included: (1) reducing the skeptical atti-
tude of criminal justice officials toward rape victims, (2) eliminating non-
legal considerations in judicial decision making, (3) improving treatment
of rape victims, (4) increasing the number of reported rapes and (5) re-
moving legal barriers to arrest, prosecution and conviction for rape.3 7
Among the most common changes adopted by the states during this re-
form movement were: (1) redefining rape and replacing the single crime
with a series of graded offenses defined by the presence or absence of
aggravating factors, (2) changing the consent standard by eliminating the
requirement that the victim physically resist her attacker, (3) eliminating
the rule that the victim's testimony be corroborated and (4) placing re-
strictions on the introduction of evidence of the victim's prior sexual
conduct.38
While Michigan is regarded as having made the greatest strides in
rape reform, Pennsylvania has also embraced strong reforms. 39 Consis-
tent with the common law construction of rape, former Pennsylvania rape
laws required that the actor have unlawful carnal knowledge of the woman
and that the act be committed forcibly and against the will of the female.4 0
34. For a discussion of rape reform and the groups involved in the movement,
see CASSIA SPOHN &JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAw REFoRm (1992).
35. Id. at 20. See generally Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality and the Legal
Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 787-90 (1988) (discussing tradi-
tional views of marital and nonmarital sex as means of maintaining patriarchal
social system).
36. Cynthia A. Wicktom, Note, Focusing on the Offender's Forceful Conduct: A Pro-
posalfor the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 399, 400 (1988) (not-
ing that power and anger are dominant motives for rape).
37. SPOHN & HoRriy, supra note 34, at 20-21. But see Lynne Henderson, Get-
ting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & LAw 41, 42
(1993) (arguing that rape laws have failed to have impact on rate of rape in United
States because cultural conventions still view rape merely as sex, rather than crimi-
nal conduct and because media continues to perpetuate belief that female submis-
sion to male dominance and aggression is natural, erotic and romantic).
38. For a more detailed discussion of the changes made in rape laws, see
SPOHN & HoRNEY, supra note 34, at 21-32.
39. Id. at 35-46 (discussing pro-victim reforms made in Michigan, Penn-
sylvania and Illinois, as well as lesser reforms made in Texas, Georgia and Washing-
ton, D.C.).
40. Act of May 12, 1966, No. 1, § 1, 1966 Pa. Laws 84 (repealed 1972) (de-
lineating requirements of crime of rape); see Mark Soifer, Comment, Revision of the
Law of Sex Crimes in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 78 Dicx. L. REv. 73, 74-84 (1973)
(comparing old rape laws with revisions that were made). The "unlawful carnal
knowledge" element required penetration, however slight, of the male's penis into
the female's vagina. Id. at 74. The force needed to satisfy the "forcibly and against
NOTE
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Using the Model Penal Code as a "starting point," the legislature made
substantial changes in the law culminating in the Pennsylvania Crime
Code of 1972.41 Among the most significant revisions made in the law
included the use of more explicit terminology defining rape. 42 For in-
stance, the term "sexual intercourse," with a broad interpretation includ-
ing traditional vaginal intercourse as well as oral and anal intercourse,
replaced the archaic phrase "unlawful carnal knowledge." 43 Similarly, the
new law eliminated the phrase "forcibly and against her will," which
caused courts to over emphasize the victim's lack of consent.44 Moreover,
her will" element need not have been actually-applied force, rather constructive or
implied force was sufficient. Id. Constructive and implied force commonly in-
volved cases where a man had intercourse with an intoxicated or mentally unaware
victim. Id. The "against her will" element introduced the concept of consent into
the crime. Id. at 75. Typically, resistance was the primary indicator of lack of con-
sent. Id. For a further discussion of consent, mens rea and resistance, see infra
notes 69-80, 116-21, and 143-82 and accompanying text.
41. Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1223 (Pa. 1986) (noting that
Model Penal Code was focal point of legislative debate leading to enactment of
Pennsylvania Crimes Code in 1972); see Soifer, supra note 40, at 77-84 (discussing
development of Pennsylvania Crimes Code).
42. Soifer, supra note 40, at 77 (comparing Pennsylvania Crimes Code of 1972
to prior statutes).
43. Id. (noting that Crimes Code retains old laws' construction of penetration
and emission); see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3121-22 (Supp. 1994) (defining
crime of rape), amended by 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3121-22 (Supp. 1995); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (Supp. 1994) (defining "sexual intercourse"), amended by
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (Supp. 1995).
44. Soifer, supra note 40, at 78. However, current law retains the concept of
force with the phrase "forcible compulsion," but avoids the ambiguities inherent in
the phrase "forcibly and against her will." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp.
1994), amended by 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1995). In Common-
wealth v. Rhodes, the court stated that the Model Penal Code approach to force
specifically focuses on physical force and acts of violence, while the Pennsylvania
concept of "forcible compulsion" has a broader meaning. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at
1224. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE 213.1 ("A man who has sexual intercourse with
a female not his wife is guilty of rape if: (a) he compels her to submit by force or by
threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be
inflicted on anyone .... ") with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1994)
(stating that rape includes sexual intercourse by "forcible compulsion"), amended
by 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1995).
Several states adhere to the "forcible compulsion" requirement in their sexual
assault and rape statutes. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61 (1994) (first-degree rape);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103 (Michie 1993) (rape); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510.040
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990) (first-degree rape); Mo. REv. STAT. § 566.030 (Supp.
1995) (rape); NY PENAL LAw § 130.35 (McKinney 1987) (first-degree rape); OR.
REv. STAT. § 163.375 (1990) (first-degree rape); WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.44.040
(1988) (first-degree rape).
Other states require that the defendant use "force or coercion" in performing
the sexual act. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(2) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that rape
is intercourse "accomplished against a person's will by means of force, violence,
duress, menace or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person of
another"); FLA. STAT. ch. 794.011 (3) (Supp. 1995) (providing life felony for sexual
battery committed when person engages in nonconsensual intercourse with an-
other person and "in the process ... uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon or
8
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Pennsylvania has departed from some of the Model Penal Code's stringent
requirements for rape by repealing the "corroboration" and "prompt-com-
plaint" requirements, and by eliminating Hale's cautionary instructions to
jurors.45 Additionally, Pennsylvania has enacted a statute, applicable to
the crime of rape (as well as to other crimes), that eliminates the require-
ment that the victim resist an attacker.46 Pennsylvania has also been
praised for its evidentiary changes, including its strong rape shield laws.4 7
Despite these legislative reforms, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
received criticism for its approach and application of the state's rape
laws.48 Particularly, critics have questioned the court's refinement of the
"forcible compulsion" requirement in Commonwealth v. Berkowitz and
uses actual physical force"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-13 (Smith-Hurd
1993) (stating that criminal sexual assault requires "sexual penetration by the use
of force or threat of force"); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-1(1) (Supp. 1994) (requiring
rape victim to be "compelled by force or imminent threat of force"); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3502(1) (a) (Supp. 1994) ("Rape is sexual intercourse with a person who
does not consent to the sexual intercourse . . . when the victim is overcome by
force or fear .... "); MD. CODE ANN., CRiM. LAW § 462 (Supp. 1991) (requiring
"intercourse by force or threat of force"); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 265, § 22 (1990) (stat-
ing that rape requires that defendant compel victim to "submit by force and
against his will"); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520(b) (1991) (providing that criminal
sexual conduct requires "force or coercion to accomplish the sexual penetration");
N.J. REv. STAT. § 2C:14-2c(1) (1995) (providing that sexual assault is committed
when actor sexually penetrates victim and "uses physical force or coercion, but the
victim does not sustain severe personal injury"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (Michie
1993) (defining criminal sexual penetration as intercourse "by use of force or co-
ercion that results in great bodily harm or great mental anguish to the victim");
OHIO Rzv. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (A) (2) (Anderson Supp. 1994) (providing rape is
committed when person engages in sexual conduct with another and "purposely
compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force"); R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 11-37-2(2) (Supp. 1994) (stating that first-degree sexual assault includes sexual
penetration when "the accused uses force or coercion"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
503(a) (1) (1991) (providing that "rape is unlawful sexual penetration of a victim"
when "force or coercion is used to accomplish the act"); Wis. STAT. § 940.225(2)
(1982) (providing that second-degree sexual assault is "sexual contact or sexual
intercourse with another person without consent of that person by use of force or
threat of force or violence").
45. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(4),(5) (requiring prompt reporting and
corroboration of victim's testimony to secure rape conviction); Rhodes, 510 A.2d at
1223 n.11 (discussing Pennsylvania's departure from Model Penal Code).
46. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107 (1983) (stating that alleged victim "need
not resist the actor in prosecutions under this chapter").
47. SPOHN & HoRNEY, supra note 34, at 41-44 (recognizing strong rape shield
laws of Pennsylvania, as well as Illinois and Michigan); see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3104 (1983) (Pennsylvania's Rape Shield Law).
48. See Scott Flander, In Rape, Force Is Required: Court Ruling Called Setback for
Women in Pennsylvania, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, June 2, 1994, at 5 (" 'The court reaf-
firmed a myth that we've been battling for centuries - that a woman has to show
up with cuts and bruises to prove that she was a rape victim,' said Vanessa Grant
Jackson, head of Women Organized Against Rape."). Prosecutor in the Berkowitz
case, Jane Roach, criticized the court's decision as a "dangerous ... confusing,
unenlightened, and unwarranted message." Jane Roach, Just Saying No Should Be
Enough, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 5, 1994, at C7. According to Roach, the force neces-
sary to commit rape is the act of intercourse "in disregard of a clear 'no.' " Id.
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whether this interpretation has effectively reinstated the resistance
requirement.49
B. Interpreting "Forcible Compulsion"
Historically, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in accord with the
goals of rape reform, broadly interpreted the forcible compulsion require-
ment.5 0 For instance, the court explicitly rejected the Model Penal Code's
emphasis on physical force and violence in Commonwealth v. Rhodes.
5 1
Thoroughly discussing the meaning of the word "force," the court stated
that "forcible compulsion" clearly connotates something more than the
exercise of sheer physical force or violence.5 2 Specifically, the court held
that" 'forcible compulsion' as used in section 3121 (1) of the Pennsylvania
statute includes not only physical force or violence but also moral, psycho-
logical or intellectual force used to compel a person to engage in sexual
intercourse against that person's will."'53
Roach commented that "[no] wasn't enough to stop a rapist, but it should have
been enough for the Supreme Court." Id.
49. See Cheryl Siskin, Note, Criminal Law - No. The "Resistance Not Required"
Statute and "Rape Shield Law" May Not Be Enough-Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 66
TEMP. L. Rxv. 531, 558-60 (1993) (discussing superior court's misapplication of
"resistance not required" statute); Lani A. Remick, Comment, Read Her Lips: An
Argument for a Verbal Consent Standard in Rape, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1103, 1116-17
(1993) (citing Berkowitz as an example of negative implications of "separate and
indispensable force requirement").
Typically, rape prevention programs and women's organizations teach women
to just say "no" to unwanted sexual advances. Melissa H. Rakas, Date Rape, AWARE:
A PUBLICATION OF THE WOMEN'S LAw CAUCUS OF VILLANOVA UNIVERSrIY, Winter
1992, at 19 (interview with Dr. Helene Feinberg-Walker) (stating that a woman
should "be firm in her NO, believing that she is entitled to her integrity"). Accord-
ing to Kathryn Geller Myers, spokeswoman for the Pennsylvania Coalition Against
Rape, the Berkowitz decision "'goes against what we've been teaching women all
these years - to say 'no,' and mean 'no,' and after that, any nonconsensual sex act
is rape .... The message here is that a woman has to physically resist and risk
serious bodily injury to prove she was raped.'" Dale Russakoff, Where Women Can't
Just Say 'No,', WASH. POST, June 3, 1994, at Al (quoting Myers). Berkowitz prosecu-
tor James Gregor's statement that "victims now better start kicking and screaming
or there will not be sufficient evidence for rape," illustrates the public's fear that
the Berkowitz decision has resurrected the resistance requirement in Pennsylvania.
Lee Linder, Saying 'No' Not Enough for Rape, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 6, 1994, at
1 (quoting Gregor).
50. See Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1224-26 (Pa. 1986).
51. Id. at 1224.
52. Id. at 1225. Because the legislature provided no definition of forcible
compulsion, the court was left with the task of interpreting the phrase. Id. at 1224-
25. However, other states have provided some legislative insight and background
into the meaning of forcible compulsion. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1995) (describing New York courts' interpretation of "forcible compul-
sion" element and legislative purpose and reasoning underlying element); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 11-37-1 (1994) (defining force or coercion).
53. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1226; see also Powe v. State, 597 So. 2d 721, 728 (Ala.
1991) (adopting Rhodes interpretation of forcible compulsion and holding that,
despite lack of physical force or express or implied threats, totality of circum-
10
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Acknowledging the fact-sensitive nature of rape cases, the Rhodes
court stated that determining whether the forcible compulsion element
was met would require a case-by-case analysis based on the totality of the
circumstances. 54 However, the court provided some guidance to the
lower courts by outlining a series of significant factors relevant to establish-
ing forcible compulsion.5 5 These factors include:
[1] the respective ages of the victim and the accused; [2] the
respective mental and physical conditions of the victim and the
accused; [3] the atmosphere and physical setting in which the
incident was alleged to have taken place; [4] the extent to which
the accused may have been in a position of authority, domination
or custodial control over the victim; and [5] whether the victim
was under duress.
56
Maintaining a flexible approach, the court stated that this list of factors
was not exhaustive and that the law "will evolve in the best tradition of the
common law - by development of a body of case law applying section
3121 (as it has been here construed) and the principles of construction set
forth in the Crimes Code."5 7
In effect, it was this very body of ensuing case law that constricted the
once broadly-defined concept of "forcible compulsion." Since Rhodes, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided only two cases where the central
issue was whether the evidence established forcible compulsion. These
cases are Commonwealth v. Mlinaich5 8 and Commonwealth v. Berkowitz.
59
In Mlinarich, the court was evenly divided as to whether a sixty-nine-
year-old guardian's threat to send a fourteen-year-old girl back to a juve-
nile detention center unless she engaged in various forms of intercourse
was sufficient to establish forcible compulsion.60 In an opinion written by
Justice Nix, a plurality of the court agreed with the superior court's rever-
sal of the defendant's rape conviction. 61 Dissenting, Justices Larsen and
stances in father-daughter relationship at issue was sufficient to uphold father's
rape conviction). Although Rhode Island's first-degree sexual assault statute re-
quires "force or coercion," rather than forcible compulsion, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court has adopted the Rhodes approach to "forcible compulsion" in de-
fining "force or coercion." See State v. Amant, 536 A.2d 897, 900-01 (R.I. 1988)
(approving Rhodes court's definition of forcible compulsion and holding that psy-
chological coercion involved in incestuous stepfather-stepdaughter relationship
was sufficient to meet statutory requirement of force or coercion for first-degree
sexual assault conviction).
54. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1226.
55. Id.
56. Id.; see also Powe, 597 So. 2d at 728 (quoting Rhodes' factors relating to
forcible compulsion).
57. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1226.
58. 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988).
59. 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
60. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d at 1336.
61. Id. at 1336, 1342.
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McDermott stated that the conviction should be reinstated. 62 Justice Lar-
sen did agree with the plurality, however, that the term " 'forcible compul-
sion' includes both physical force as well as psychological duress."
63
However, the plurality also stated that "[w]e are constrained to reject the
contention that 'forcible compulsion' was intended by the General Assem-
bly.., to be extended to embrace appeals to the intellect or the morals of
the victim."64 Therefore, Justice Nix took a much more narrow view of
forcible compulsion than the Rhodes court's interpretation.
65
62. Id. at 1342-50.
63. Id. at 1343-44. The dissenting opinion remained silent on the issues of
intellectual and moral coercion. Id. For cases involving psychological coercion,
see Commonwealth v. Ruppert, 579 A.2d 966, 969 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (finding
that father's encouragement of daughter to imitate acts depicted in sexually ex-
plicit pictures was sufficient evidence to establish psychological coercion), alloc.
denied, 588 A.2d 914 (Pa. 1991); Commonwealth v. Frank, 577 A.2d 609, 619 (Pa.
Super. Ct.) (finding that patient-psychologist relationship coupled with psycholo-
gist's threat to ruin 11-year-old patient's chance for adoption if she did not submit
is sufficient evidence to establish psychological coercion), aboc. denied, 584 A.2d
312 (Pa. 1990); Commonwealth v. Dorman, 547 A.2d 757, 761-62 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988) (finding psychological force established when victim's uncle took her to iso-
lated area and had intercourse with her after she verbally protested), aboc. denied,
571 A.2d 380 (Pa. 1989). But see Commonwealth v. Titus, 556 A.2d 425, 429-30
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (finding psychological force not established when daughter
only lived with father short time before incident and no specific evidence illus-
trated that he exercised authority over her).
64. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d at 1338. In Berkowitz, the superior court rejected the
precedential value of the plurality opinion of Mlinarich; therefore, the Rhodes fac-
tors, which include moral and intellectual coercion, remained in effect. See Com-
monwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), aff'd in part &
vacated in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994) (finding no evidence of moral or intellec-
tual coercion); Commonwealth v. Ables, 590 A.2d 334, 338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
(holding that position of confidence and trust coupled with emotional exploita-
tion is sufficient to establish moral coercion).
However, when Berkowitz reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the court
revived the Mlinarich case, citing it with more frequency than Rhodes. Berkowitz, 641
A.2d at 1164 n.4 (attempting to reconcile plurality and dissenting opinions in
Mlinarich by suggesting that Mlinarich dissenters did not take issue with certain
implicit holdings and contentions in plurality opinion).
65. Compare Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335, 1342 (Pa. 1988)
(plurality opinion) (construing Rhodes to require psychological coercion to reach
"such intensity that it may overpower the will to resist as effectively as physical
force") with Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1227 (Pa. 1986) (stating
that resistance is not required). Justice Larsen, writing the dissenting opinion in
Mlinarich, stated that the plurality opinion ignored Rhodes by failing to distinguish
it or to explain why it was not controlling. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d at 1349 (Larsen, J.,
dissenting). In the dissenting opinion, Justice Larsen seemed to maintain the
Rhodes court's broad approach to forcible compulsion. The dissenting opinion
concluded that Mlinarich's threat to deprive the child of liberty by taking her back
to the juvenile detention center constituted threats of force and violence. Id. at
1343 (Larsen, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Larsen stated, "if Mlinarich's con-
duct here did not constitute 'psychological duress' which overwhelmed the will of
the victim, then I doubt that any conduct could." Id. at 1344 (Larsen, J.,
dissenting).
[Vol. 40: p. 193
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In Berkowitz, the Pennsylvania Superior Court seemed to adhere more
closely to the analysis set forth in Rhodes.66 Examining and applying the
Rhodes factors to the facts of Berkowitz, the court found that the "cold" rec-
ord did not support a finding of forcible compulsion.6 7 According to the
court, intercourse without consent is insufficient for a rape conviction, but
could support a conviction for indecent assault.68
66. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1344 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990), aff'd in part & vacated in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994) (rejecting any
changes Mlinarich might have made in law because Mlinarich was non-binding plu-
rality opinion).
67. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1347. In its analysis of the Rhodes factors, the supe-
rior court stated that:
The cold record is utterly devoid of any evidence regarding the respective
sizes of either appellant or the victim. As such, we are left only to specu-
late as to the coercive effect of such acts as "leaning" against the victim or
placing the "weight of his body" on top of her. This we may not do.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Roscioli, 309 A.2d 396, 398 (Pa. 1973); Common-
wealth v. Scott, 597 A.2d 1220, 1221 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)).
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the prosecutor argued that
the superior court usurped the jury's role by substituting its determinations of
credibility and weight of the evidence for those reached by the jury. Brief for the
Commonwealth at 8-11, Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994)
[hereinafter Commonwealth's Brief]. The prosecutor argued that "this analysis
totally ignores the fact that the jury was in a position to make this evaluation by
observing the individuals in the courtroom, that the jury had already made this
determination, and was, in fact, the only entity legally competent to draw these
conclusions." Id. at 9. Despite this argument, the supreme court found that the
superior court did not err in reversing the conviction. Commonwealth v.
Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1165 (Pa. 1994).
68. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1348. Compare 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121
(Supp. 1994) (providing that rape requires penetration by forcible compulsion),
amended by 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1995) with 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3126 (Supp. 1994) (providing that indecent assault requires indecent
touching without consent), amended y 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3126 (Supp.
1995). Indecent contact is defined as "[alny touching of the sexual or other inti-
mate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, in
either person." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (Supp. 1994), amended by 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (Supp. 1995). Under this formulation, fondling a vic-
tim's breast without consent is the equivalent of penetrating her without consent-
both are second-degree misdemeanors. Siskin, supra note 49, at 534 (arguing that
most fundamental difference between rape and indecent assault is penetration);
see Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1166 (Pa. 1994) (reinstating trial
court's indecent assault conviction). In affirming the superior court's reversal of
the rape conviction, the supreme court adopted the lower court's statutory inter-
pretation that, because consent is "conspicuously absent" from the rape statute,
but present in the indecent assault statute, the legislature must have intended rape
and forcible compulsion to include something more than nonconsensual inter-
course. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164. For a complete discussion of the supreme
court's rationale in Berkowitz, see infra notes 109-28 and accompanying text.
Other courts have also agreed with the Berkowitz approach. See People v. Se-
nior, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 14 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that "'force' means 'physical
force' in excess of that required for the lewd act" (citing People v. Quinones, 249
Cal. Rptr. 435, 438 (Ct. App.), review denied, 249 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1988)));Jones v.
State, 589 N.E.2d 241, 243 (Ind. 1992) (finding that, although complainant did
not consent, there was no evidence that defendant used any force or threats to
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C. Consent, Mens Rea and Resistance in Rape
Inextricably related to the concept of forcible compulsion are the is-
sues of consent, mens rea and resistance. 69 Often, the consent require-
engage in intercourse); People v. Patterson, 410 N.W.2d 733, 743 (Mich. 1987)
(noting that, if legislature wanted to make all nonconsensual sexual contact pun-
ishable without force, it would have done so); State v. Jacques, 536 A.2d 535, 537
(R.I. 1988) (holding that force inherent in intercourse is not enough); State v.
Ritola, 817 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that "[florcible com-
pulsion requires more than the force normally used to achieve sexual intercourse
or sexual contact" (citing State v. McKnight, 774 P.2d 532 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989))).
In July of 1992, the NewJersey Supreme Court faced a case similar to Berkowitz
in that the NewJersey defendant had intercourse with the victim, despite her ver-
bally-expressed lack of consent. In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992). Contrary
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's approach in Berkowitz, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that "physical force in excess of that inherent in the act of
sexual penetration is not required for such penetration to be unlawful." Id. at
1277 (reversing superior court's reversal of conviction).
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not address the persuasive au-
thority of M.TS. in the Berkowitz decision, the attorneys debated the relevance of
the case in their briefs. See Brief for Appellee at 19-20, Commonwealth v.
Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994) [hereinafter Appellee's Brief] (arguing that,
in Pennsylvania statute, word "forcible" modifies type of compulsion, while "[t]he
NewJersey provision of physical force or coercion has no such modifying language"
and noting factual difference that atmosphere in M.T.S. was more coercive be-
cause defendant sneaked into victim's room late at night and only ceased his attack
after being slapped). But see Brief for Amici Curiae in Support of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania at 22-23, Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161
(1994) (urging court to follow M.T.S. approach because of similarities between
Berkowitz and M.T.S.).
Other courts have agreed with New Jersey's view that the force inherent in
intercourse is enough to satisfy the statutory force requirement. See D.D. v. State,
842 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that, because physical force re-
quired for forcible compulsion is defined as any bodily impact, restraint or con-
finement, penetration is enough for conviction); State v. Sedia, 614 So. 2d 533, 535
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that, for sexual battery, "state need not prove
that the defendant used more physical force than merely the physical force neces-
sary to accomplish sexual penetration" (citing Lowry v. Parole & Probation
Comm'n, 474 So. 2d 1248, 1249-50 (Fla. 1985))); State v. Brown, 609 N.E.2d 346,
355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (noting that, when victim does not consent to sexual rela-
tions, ensuing act of sexual penetration is committed by force); Commonwealth v.
Carracciola, 569 N.E.2d 774, 776 (Mass. 1991) (finding force involved in sexual
penetration sufficient to meet statutory force requirement); State v. Bonds, 477
N.W.2d 265, 266 (Wis. 1991) (finding that "force employed in the actual noncon-
sensual contact" may be sufficient force to sustain second-degree sexual assault
conviction).
69. See generally Symonds, The Rape Victim: Psychological Patterns of Response, 36
AM. J. PSvCHoANALislS 27 (1976) (noting that consent is product of particular vic-
tim's actions and reactions, and sometimes victim may exhibit submissive behavior
to prevent further aggressions). Under early rape laws that defined rape as "unlaw-
ful carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly against her will," the essential elements
of rape were penetration, force and lack of consent. Commonwealth v. Rhodes,
510 A.2d 1217, 1221 (Pa. 1986) (quoting Act of June 24, 1939, Pub. L. No. 872,
§ 721).
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ment caused courts to focus excessively on the acts of the victim.70 The
courts strictly scrutinized each victim's behavior with the belief that a vic-
tim's physical resistance was most probative of nonconsent.7 1 Because of
their excessive focus on victims, courts often ignore an element essential
to criminal liability, the "mens rea" of the defendant as to the essential
elements of the crime.72 Like other courts, Pennsylvania has paid little
attention to the defendant's "mens rea."
73
70. Christina M. Tchen, Rape Reform and a Statutory Consent Defens 74J. CRiM.
L. & CIMINOLOW 1518, 1525-27 (1983) (noting that resistance requirements im-
properly focus court's analysis on victim's conduct, rather than defendant's
conduct).
71. Note, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. REv. 680, 682
(1966) (noting that presence or absence of consent turned on victim's credibility
and that, therefore, evidence of resistance bolstered victim's credibility because it
was "outward manifestation of nonconsent").
In early cases, courts required victims to resist to the "utmost." See, e.g., People
v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 117 (Cal. 1986) (observing that, "[h]istorically, it was con-
sidered inconceivable that a woman who truly did not consent to sexual inter-
course would not meet force with force"); Moss v. State, 45 So. 2d 125, 126 (Miss.
1950) ("[A] mere tactical surrender in the face of an assumed superior physical
force is not enough. Where the penalty for the defendant may be supreme, so
must resistance be unto the uttermost."); People v. Carey, 119 N.E. 83, 83 (N.Y.
1918) ("Rape is not committed unless the woman opposes the man to the utmost
limit of her power."); Commonwealth v. Moran, 97 Pa. Super. 120, 124 (1929)
(declaring that actual resistance is material element of rape); Starr v. State, 237
N.W. 96, 97 (Wis. 1931) (finding woman must provide maximum resistance be-
cause voluntary submission after assault negates essential elements of rape).
72. See SANFORD H. KADIsH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAw AND ITS
PROCESSES 218 (5th ed. 1989) (noting that "legislatures have often left the mental
element undefined or have treated it ambiguously, while courts have as often
failed to analyze it with precision"). In particular, "rape statutes almost invariably
fail to specify the mens rea (if any) required with respect to the victim's consent."
Id. at 257; see also Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1094-1132 (1986) (arguing
that courts should focus on mens rea of defendants, rather than on attitudes of
victims, when reviewing consent issue).
73. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 418 A.2d 537, 539 (Pa. Super. 1980). In
Carter, the superior court noted that the intent required to establish culpability is
absent from the rape statute. Id. In attempting to discern the mental state re-
quired for the material elements of rape, the court turned to section 302(c) of the
Crimes Code which provides, "[w] hen the culpability sufficient to establish a mate-
rial element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a
person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto." Id. (cita-
tion omitted). The court held that at least recklessness was required where a per-
son was charged with raping an individual "so mentally deranged or deficient that
she was incapable of consent." Id. In dicta, the superior court stated that "the
defendant [must have] acted at least recklessly" with regard to the other elements
of the section. Id. However, because this statement is dicta in the superior court's
opinion, the law as to the defendant's mental state for the elements of rape, in-
cluding the victim's lack of consent, is still unclear. For a further discussion of
mens rea and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's failure to discuss this in Berkowitz,
see supra notes 69-72 and infra notes 170-82 and accompanying text.
The New Jersey Supreme Court is one of the few courts to consider a defend-
ant's mental state thoroughly. See In reM.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1278-80 (NJ. 1992).
In adopting the negligence standard for the defendant's mental state as to the
victim's lack of consent, the court noted that "[t]he role of the factfinder is to
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However, in an effort concerted with rape reform, the Pennsylvania
legislature adopted the "resistance not required" statute.74 In Rhodes, the
decide not whether engaging in an act of penetration without permission of an-
other person is reasonable, but only whether the defendant's belief that the al-
leged victim had freely given affirmative permission was reasonable." Id. at 1279.
The court stressed that the focus should remain on the defendant and that "the
law places no burden on the alleged victim to have expressed non-consent or to
have denied permission." Id. (stating that victim may only be questioned about
what she did to determine whether defendant held reasonable belief that her af-
firmative permission was freely given). Therefore, the state must prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that "a reasonable person would not have believed that there
was affirmative freely-given permission." Id. If there is evidence suggesting that
the defendant reasonably believed he had the complainant's permission, then "the
State must demonstrate either that defendant did not actually believe that affirma-
tive permission had been freely-given or that such a belief was unreasonable under
all the circumstances." Id.
For examples of other states' treatment of a defendant's mental state see, Er-
vin v. State, 761 P.2d 124, 125 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (citing Reynold v. State, 664
P.2d 621, 625 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983)) (holding that "state must show that the
defendant acted recklessly in determining whether the alleged victim consented to
the sexual activity" and rejecting negligence standard that reasonable and good-
faith belief of victim's consent constitutes defense to rape); State v. Smith, 554
A.2d 713, 717 (Conn. 1989) (rejecting notion that state must prove that defendant
was actually aware of, or recklessly disregarded, victim's lack of consent or that he
recklessly disregarded it, but accepting negligence standard such that "defendant
may not be convicted ... if the words or conduct of the complainant under all the
circumstances would justify a reasonable belief that she had consented"); Com-
monwealth v. Simcock, 575 N.E.2d 1137, 1141 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (accepting
negligence standard such that honest, but reasonable mistake as to consent may be
defense to rape), review denied, 579 N.E.2d 1360 (Mass. 1991); State v. Aumick, 869
P.2d 421, 424 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that "conviction of rape is possible
without proof of any mental state"), aff'd, 894 P.2d 1325 (Wash. 1995); State v.
Walden, 841 P.2d 81, 84 n.2 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that "the focus is on
the victim's consent or lack of consent rather than the perpetrator's subjective
assessment thereof").
74. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107 (1983) ("The alleged victim need not
resist the actor in prosecutions under this chapter .... "). But see 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3121(2) (Supp. 1994) (providing person can commit rape by "threat
of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable
resolution"), amended by 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121(2) (Supp. 1995).
Several states have abolished the resistance requirement. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.470(8) (A) (1994) (" 'without consent' means that a person with or without
resisting, is coerced"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.720, para. 5/12-17 (Smith-Hurd 1993)
("Lack of verbal or physical resistance or submission by the victim resulting from
the use of force or threat of force by the accused shall not constitute consent");
MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.520i (1991) ("[VIictim need not resist.. ."); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.347(2) (Supp. 1995) ("no need to show that the victim resisted the ac-
cused"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-IOA (Michie 1994) ("resistance . .. is not an ele-
ment of force"); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(C) (Anderson Supp. 1994)
("victim need not prove physical resistance"); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-12 (1994)
(not requiring proof of resistance if resistance is useless and might result in bodily
harm); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3254(1) (Supp. 1994) ("Lack of consent may be
shown without proof of resistance .... ").
However, remnants of the resistance requirement remain. See ALA. CODE
§ 13A-6-60(8) (1994) (providing forcible compulsion requires "[pihysical force
that overcomes earnest resistance"); State v. Lima, 643 P.2d 536, 541 (Haw. 1982)
16
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court, interpreting this statute, stated that the victim need not actually re-
sist to prove forcible compulsion. 75 In Mlinarich, however, the plurality
construed the "resistance not required" statute more narrowly, stating
that, while compulsion is still required, "[t] he degree of resistance ... was
modified to remove the requirement that the victim continue the struggle
when struggle would be useless and dangerous." 76 Disagreeing with this
proposition, the Mlinarich dissenters disagreed and emphatically stated
that " [t] his section does not merely 'modify' the 'degree of resistance re-
quirement,' . . it makes it clear that there is no such requirement -
period!"77
(finding victim's pleas to attacker to stop and victim's attempt to push him off of
her insufficient to exhibit "genuine physical" effort to resist); Yarnell v. Common-
wealth, 833 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Ky. 1992) (finding "earnest resistance" for forcible
compulsion "requires more than token initial resistance but less than showing that
the victim was physically incapable of additional struggle against the assailant");
Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213 (Md. 1979) ("It is true that she told the appellant
she 'didn't want to do that [stuff].' But the resistance that must be shown involves
not merely verbal but physical resistance 'to the extent of her a6ility at the time.' "
(quoting Hazel v. State, 157 A.2d 922, 925 (Md. Ct. App. 1960))); State v. Nixon,
858 S.W.2d 782, 785-86 (Mo. 1993) (finding that forcible compulsion may be
proved by evidence of physical force that overcomes reasonable resistance or by a
threat that places a person in reasonable fear of death, serious physical injury or
kidnapping, but that "[r] esistance never comes into play where a threat (construc-
tive force) is employed"); MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (providing compulsion
plainly implies non-consent and the phrase "compels to submit" requires more
than a "token initial resistance"); see also Estrich, supra note 72 at 1121-32 (discuss-
ing negative effects of consent and resistance requirements on women); Schwartz,
An Argument for the Elimination of the Resistance Requirement from the Definition of Forci-
ble Rape, 16 Loy. LA. L. REv. 567 (1983) (arguing that resistance should not be
required in rape); Wicktom, supra note 36, at 401-03 (arguing that resistance re-
quirement should be eliminated because it is not reliable indicator of victim's non-
consent and because physical resistance may increase victim's risk of injury).
75. 510 A.2d 1217, 1227 n.14 (Pa. 1986).
76. 542 A.2d 1335, 1341 (Pa. 1988). Specifically, the plurality opinion dis-
cussed the requirement that the threat of forcible compulsion be such as "would
prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution." Id. According to the
court, this mandates an "objective" test to determine "whether the pressure gener-
ated upon the victim by the threat would be such as to overcome the resolve and
prevent further resistance of a person of reasonable resolution." Id. at 1340.
77. Id. at 1346. Writing the dissenting opinion, Justice Larsen explained:
There is some objective measurement in the language "threat of forcible
compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable reso-
lution," but section 3107 clarifies that this is not a requirement that the
victim must have put forth some minimum level of actual resistance. This
language does ensure that the threat must meet some minimum level of
forcible compulsion, so that mere seduction or persuasion will not suf-
fice; however, the language is not meant to require some minimum level
of actual resistance or to preclude the jury from considering the emo-
tional makeup of the victim in determining whether the actor used forci-
ble compulsion to overbear her will.
Id. (Larsen, J., dissenting).
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In Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, the superior court discussed the issues of
consent and resistance as they applied to forcible compulsion. 78 Although
the court noted that verbal resistance is relevant in a determination of
forcible compulsion, the court found that verbal protests were not "dispos-
itive or sufficient evidence of forcible compulsion." 79 As a result of this
court's finding, critics have interpreted the Berkowitz court to have promul-
gated a "no means yes" mentality.8 0 Confronted with the public's disap-
78. 609 A.2d 1338, 1347 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), aff'd in part & vacated in part,
641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994). The legislative purpose behind the 1976 Amendments
to the Crimes Code, which includes section 3107 was to provide a procedural
change in the way trials were conducted so that "the victim is no longer treated as
the defendant and the defendant can still receive a very fair trial." Legislative Jour-
nal - Senate, p. 1462 (April 6, 1976). In Appellee's Brief, defense counsel for
Berkowitz pointed out that any intention to change the elements of the offense of
rape was conspicuously absent. Appellee's Brief, supra note 68, at 34. Moreover,
defense counsel noted that the "no resistance" statute is not found within the statu-
tory scheme for rape, rather it is found in the general provisions of the Penn-
sylvania Crimes Code. Id. at 32. Defense counsel concluded that "[iff section 3107
abrogates or somehow diminishes the element of forcible compulsion ... it would
have been duly noted at that juncture." Id. at 33.
79. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1348; see People v. Schmidt, 885 P.2d 312, 316 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1994) (expressly rejecting Berkowitz rationale and holding that "the state-
ment 'no' provides a sufficient basis upon which a jury could find that a victim
resisted sexual intercourse and that a defendant thereafter caused 'submission
against the victim's will' "), cert. denied, 885 P.2d 312 (Colo. 1994).
As in the Berkowitz case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has only found ver-
bal protestations to be sufficient for a rape conviction when they were coupled
with forcible compulsion. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1348. According to the superior
court, the
"no resistance requirement" must be applied only to prevent any adverse
inference to be drawn against the person who, while being "forcibly com-
pelled" to engage in intercourse, chooses not to physically resist ....
Since there is no evidence that the instant victim was at any time "forcibly
compelled" to engage in sexual intercourse, our conclusion is not at odds
with the "no resistance requirement."
Id. at 1348 n.7 (emphasis omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Meadows, 553 A.2d
1006, 1008 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (finding evidence of forcible compulsion suffi-
cient where victim verbally resisted, pushed against defendant before and during
intercourse, and was in vacant field with defendant), alloc. denied, 571 A.2d 381 (Pa.
1989); Commonwealth v. Dorman, 547 A.2d 757, 758 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (find-
ing resistance beyond victim's pleas of "don't" not required when forcible com-
pulsion established by taking victim to remote area and disrobing her);
Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 768 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (finding addi-
tional resistance not required where there is tangible evidence of physical force or
threats of force-i.e., forcible compulsion); Commonwealth v. Rough, 418 A.2d
605, 609 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (same); Commonwealth v. Irvin, 393 A.2d 1042,
1044 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (same); Estrich, supra note 72, at 1131 ("[Flor many
courts, saying 'no' - passive resistance - does not count as resistance.").
80. Linder, supra note 49, at 1 (discussing critics' reaction to Berkowitz). Ac-
cording to Kathryn Geller Myers, spokeswoman for the Pennsylvania Coalition
Against Rape, "[t]he message is clear . . .that 'no' really doesn't mean 'no' in
Pennsylvania." Id. at 14; see also Henderson, supra note 37, at 54-55 (discussing how
"no means yes" belief has existed for centuries and is fueled by myths of domi-
nance and submission); ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 4, at 207 (discussing
"no means yes" mentality); EsTrIcH, supra note 9, at 39 (stating that, in addition to
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proval of the superior court's opinon and with the aforementioned
tumultuous history of rape jurisprudence, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court confronted the issues in Commonwealth v. Berkowitz.
III. COMMONWEALTH v. BERJowrrz-A PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT
CONTROVERSY AND THE PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATURE'S CATALYST
A. The Culmination of Pennsylvania's Rape Law Jurisprudence:
Commonwealth v. Berkowitz
1. Facts and Procedural History
On the afternoon of April 19, 1988, the victim, a nineteen-year-old
sophomore at East Stroudsburg State University, walked to her boyfriend's
dormitory.8 1 While waiting for her boyfriend to meet her, she visited a
friend who lived in the same building. 82 After knocking several times and
receiving no answer, she tried the door knob.83 Finding the door open,
she walked into the room and saw someone lying on the bed with a pillow
over his head.84 After removing the pillow from his face, she realized the
man she thought was her friend was her friend's roommate, Robert
Berkowitz. 85
Berkowitz asked the victim to stay for a while and she agreed.8 6 Then,
Berkowitz asked the victim to give him a back rub and to sit on his bed, but
the victim declined.8 7 After conversing briefly, Berkowitz moved off the
bed and onto the floor where the victim was sitting.8 8 Once on the floor,
saying no, society has viewed active resistance as indicator that women really desire
forceful penetration).
81. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1339 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992),
aff'd inpart & vacated inpart, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994). Before leaving her room,
the victim testified that she drank a martini "to loosen up a bit." Id. She also
stated that she had argued with her boyfriend the night before. Id.
82. Id. (setting forth factual background of case).
83. Id. Before trying the door, the victim wrote a note to her friend, notifying
him that she had stopped by. Id. In the note, the victim stated that she was drunk.
Id. However, the victim testified that she was merely joking and did not feel any
intoxicating effects from the martini. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1340.
86. Id. Defendant Berkowitz testified that the victim's visit confirmed his sus-
picion that she wanted to pursue sexual relations with him. Id. at 1341. The de-
fendant stated that he based his belief on two instances, a phone conversation with
the victim during which she asked him the size of his penis, and a drunken visit by
the victim during which she laid on his bed in a provocative position and asked to
see his penis. Id. The victim admitted calling the defendant and asking him about
his penis. Id. She also remembered going to his room and laying on his bed while
intoxicated. Id. However, she could not remember if she asked about his penis on
this occasion. Id.
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Berkowitz "kind of pushed the [victim] back with his body."8 9 Berkowitz
then straddled the victim and started kissing her.90 Despite her protests
that she had to leave to meet her boyfriend, Berkowitz lifted up her shirt
and brassiere and began fondling her breasts. 91 At this point, the victim
said, "No."92
After more kissing and fondling, Berkowitz unzipped his pants and
tried to insert his penis in her mouth.93 The victim continued to verbally
protest saying "no," "let me go" and "I gotta meet my boyfriend."94 Be-
cause Berkowitz was laying on the victim throughout the encounter, the
victim was unable to move. 95
Disregarding the victim's continual protests that she had to leave,
Berkowitz locked the door and put her on the bed.96 Berkowitz then
straddled her again and untied the knot in her sweatpants. The victim
neither physically resisted nor screamed. 97
After removing her sweatpants and underwear, Berkowitz used his
hand to guide his penis into her vagina. 98 After Berkowitz had penetrated
her vagina, the victim began saying "no" again.99 After thirty seconds, the
defendant pulled out his penis, ejaculated on the victim's stomach and
immediately got off of her.100 The defendant then said, "Wow, I guess we
89. Id. The victim described Berkowitz's action by stating, "It wasn't a shove,
it was just kind of a leaning type of thing." Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. Berkowitz testified that the victim was responding warmly to his ad-
vances by passionately returning his kisses. Id. at 1341.
92. Id. at 1340.
93. Id.
94. Id. The victim indicated that her statements were made in a scolding tone
of voice. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The victim testified that she knew the door was of the type that could
not lock people inside the room. Id. In describing Berkowitz's actions, the victim
stated, "[Berkowitz] didn't throw me on the bed .... It was kind of like a push but
no .... It wasn't slow like a romantic kind of thing, but it wasn't a fast shove either.
It was kind of in the middle." Id.
97. Id. The victim testified that she "couldn't like go anywhere" because
Berkowitz was on top of her. Id. Moreover, she did not scream, because "it was
like a dream was happening or something." Id.
98. Id. The defendant testified that the victim assisted him throughout the
encounter by helping him remove her clothes. Id. at 1341.
99. Id. at 1340. The victim described her words as "soft... in a moaning kind
of way because it was just so scary." Id. The defendant agreed that the victim was
saying "no" but stated that her words were moaned passionately. Id. at 1341.
100. Id. Berkowitz testified that he immediately withdrew when he saw a
"blank look on her face" and asked her if anything was wrong. Id. at 1341. He
ejaculated on her stomach because he could "no longer control himself." Id. He
stated that, after it was over, "she made her move" and got off the bed immediately.
Id.
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just got carried away."101 The victim responded, "No we didn't get carried
away, you got carried away." 102
After quickly dressing, the victim raced downstairs to her boyfriend
who had finally arrived in the lounge.' 03 She began to cry and her boy-
friend took her to his room where he called the police and she cleaned
the semen from her stomach.10 4
Subsequently, Berkowitz was arrested and charged with rape and in-
decent assault. Following a trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe
County, the jury found Berkowitz guilty of both charges.10 5 After his post-
trial motions were denied, Berkowitz appealed to the superior court.'0 6 In
a per curiam opinion, the court discharged the rape conviction. In addi-
tion, the court reversed and remanded on the charge of indecent assault
because it found that evidence was improperly excluded under Penn-
sylvania's Rape Shield Law. 07 The Commonwealth appealed and the
supreme court granted allocatur to address the issue concerning the de-
gree of force necessary to satisfy the "forcible compulsion" element of the
rape statute. 10 8
2. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Analysis
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the superior
court's dismissal of the defendant's rape charge, because the evidence did
not satisfy the "forcible compulsion" element of the rape statute.' 09 How-
ever, the court found that the lower court's reversal of the jury's indecent
assault charge was erroneous. 0 Therefore, finding the elements of inde-
101. Id. at 1340.
102. Id. The defendant wholly corroborated this aspect of the victim's ac-
count. Id. at 1341.
103. Id. at 1340.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1341-42.
107. Id. at 1352. The trial court permitted the defendant to introduce evi-
dence about the victim's prior contact with the defendant including the phone call
during which the victim asked about the size of Berkowitz's penis and her previous
visit to his room. Id. at 1341. Additionally, the court allowed general evidence that
the victim had been quarreling with her boyfriend. Id. at 1351. However, the
court refused to allow detailed evidence about the nature of their disagreement or
about the victim's past reputation for engaging in consensual intercourse. Id.
108. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1162-63 (Pa. 1994). The
court also granted allocatur to further define the scope of Pennsylvania's Rape
Shield Law. Id.
109. Id. at 1166. Given that the victim stated "no" throughout the encounter
and that the defendant himself testified to the indecent contact, the court found
that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conviction of indecent assault.
Id. Moreover, the court found that the trial court properly applied the Rape
Shield Law to exclude evidence showing. that the victim and her boyfriend argued
over whether she had been unfaithful. Id. at 1165.
110. Id. at 1166. The superior court had reversed and remanded the case on
the indecent assault charge because it believed the trial judge improperly excluded
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cent assault satisfied, the court reinstated Defendant Berkowitz's convic-
tion and sentence for the indecent assault charge."'
a. Rape and Forcible Compulsion
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Berkowitz court was
compelled to construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences that
could be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict win-
ner, the Commonwealth.1 12 Examining the evidence under the Rhodes
court's formulation of "forcible compulsion," the court concluded that the
testimony contained no reference to force or threat of force.1 13 Unlike
the superior court's systematic inquiry into the factors set forth in Rhodes,
the supreme court reached its conclusion that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to establish forcible compulsion by noting that the victim did not
discourage the defendant or try to leave when he made advances toward
her and was not threatened or restrained during the encounter. 114 The
court determined that the only force applied to the victim was the weight
of Berkowitz's body on top of her and that this was not enough force to
establish forcible compulsion.1 15
b. The Relevance of "No"
In addressing the fact that the victim repeated "no" during the en-
counter, the Berkowitz court held that her words were only relevant to con-
sent, not to force. 116 Although the superior court refused to rely on
Mlinarich because it was a plurality decision with questionable precedential
value, the supreme court applied the principles established by the
Mlinarich plurality to the facts of Berkowitz. 117 According to the court, the
ruling in Mlinarich "implicitly dictates that where there is lack of consent,
but no showing of either physical force, a threat of physical force, or psy-
evidence offered by Berkowitz under the Rape Shield Law. Id. at 1165. Defense
counsel attempted to show that the victim had a motive to lie by introducing evi-
dence that her boyfriend was jealous and that they had argued over whether she
was unfaithful. Id. The superior court tried to distinguish this evidence from evi-
dence protected by the Rape Shield Law by noting that the "proffered evidence
was not that the victim had, in fact been unfaithful, but rather only that the victim
and her boyfriend had argued over whether or not she had been unfaithful." Id.
The supreme court stated that the Rape Shield Law did not recognize this distinc-
tion because whether a victim was unfaithful was closely tied to the victim's reputa-
tion for chastity, which is protected by the Rape Shield Law. Id.
111. Id. at 1166.
112. Id. at 1163.
113. Id. The supreme court also noted that "[t]he force necessary to support
a conviction of rape.., need only be such as to establish lack of consent and to
induce the [victim] to submit without additional resistance." Id. (quoting Com-
monwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1225 (Pa. 1986)).
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chological coercion, the 'forcible compulsion' requirement .. . is not
met."11 8
In addition, the court supported its position that forcible compulsion
requires more than nonconsensual intercourse by examining the rape stat-
ute in conjunction with the statute governing the "related but distinct
crime" of indecent assault.11 9 The court noted that the indecent assault
statute requires nonconsent of the victim, while the rape statute has no
such element.12 0 Therefore, the court concluded that, if the legislature
wanted to equate nonconsensual intercourse with forcible compulsion, it
would have done so expressly in the statute.1 2 1
c. The Indecent Assault Charge
In reviewing the indecent assault issue, the court concluded that the
testimony established the elements of the offense: indecent contact and
lack of consent. 122 According to the court, the defendant testified to the
indecent contact by admitting he had intercourse with the victim.1 23 In
addition, the court found that the victim's statement of "no" sufficiently
established lack of consent.1 24 Therefore, the court reinstated the inde-
cent assault conviction.12 5
118. Id. The court attempted to-reconcile Mlinarich's plurality and dissenting
opinions by stating that the dissenting opinion did not challenge the implicit hold-
ing of the plurality opinion that something more than a lack of consent is required
to prove forcible compulsion. Id. at 1164 n.4. Moreover, the court stated that
both opinions agreed that psychological force, physical force and threat of physical
force had to reach such a degree as to "prevent resistance by a person of reason-
able resolution." Id. According to the supreme court, the dissenting opinion only
distinguished itself from the plurality opinion by urging that subjective factors be
considered in determining resistance, assent and consent. Id.
119. Id. at 1164-65.
120. Id. Compare 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3126 (Supp. 1994) (providing
indecent assault has consent element, but not forcible compulsion element),
amended by 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3126 (Supp. 1995) with 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1994) (requiring forcible compulsion, but not mentioning
consent), amended by 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1995).
121. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164. The court acknowledged that it was taking a
strict interpretation of the rape statute, but justified it in light of the need to pro-
vide fair warning to defendants. Id. at 1165.
122. Id. at 1166. Moreover, the court found that the trial court had not erred
by excluding evidence under the Rape Shield Law; therefore, there was no need to
remand the case. Id. at 1165. For a discussion of the Rape Shield Law in Berkowitz,
see infra note 125.
123. Id. at 1166.
124. Id.
125. Id. After this decision, the defendant applied for a reargument on the
indecent assault charge alleging prosecutorial misconduct during the trial. Com-
monwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, reh'g denied, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
The supreme court did not address this issue, but the superior court did. Com-
monwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1351-52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), aff'd in part
& vacated in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994). The superior court concluded that
the prosecutor took unfair advantage of the Rape Shield exclusion of the evidence
illustrating the jealous nature of victim's boyfriend. Id. According to the defense
1995]
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Upon the release of the Berkowitz ruling, "a firestorm of controversy
engulfed Pennsylvania and the country."12 6 As a result of this public out-
cry, Pennsylvania legislators directed their attention to rape reform.12 7 Af-
ter a year of political volleying and numerous fallen attempts, the House
of Representatives and Senate unanimously passed a revised statutory
scheme that Governor Ridge endorsed on March 31, 1995.128
B. The Pennsylvania General Assembly's Response to Berkowitz
Following the Berkowitz decision and the public controversy that fol-
lowed its release, the Pennsylvania legislature focused its attention on rape
counsel, this evidence suggested a motive for the victim to lie. Id. In closing argu-
ments, the prosecutor emphasized the lack of motive to fabricate by saying, "Why
would she lie? ... [T]here's just really no reason to believe she would lie and go
through this .... [I]f there was any reason, there's no reason here. I suggest to
you, you have to have a reason." Id. In the application for reargument, defense
counsel noted that the victim "did have a reason to lie. The prosecutor knew that.
The trial judge knew that. Unfortunately, the jury did not." Application for Rear-
gument for Appellee at 4, Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
The supreme court denied the motion. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d
1161, reh'g denied, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
126. Kathryn Geller Myers, Supreme Court Ruling Stirs National Debate, SPoKES-
woMAN, Summer 1994, at 1. For weeks after the decision, the Pennsylvania Coali-
tion Against Rape was the focus of numerous newspaper articles, radio shows and
television broadcasts extending as far away as Toronto, Hawaii, Seattle and
London. Id. In addition, the National Organization for Women launched two
protest marches, one outside Justice Cappy's office (the author of the supreme
court's Berkowitz opinion) and one outside Justice Nix's office, to raise public
awareness about the opinion and express its outrage. Jan Ackerman, Two Protests
By NOW Take Judges to Task on Rape Ruling, Prrr. POST-GAZETrE, June 7, 1994, at BI;
see also Myers, supra, at 1 (discussing protestors' efforts and noting similar rally of
over 100 people at Monroe County Courthouse where Berkowitz was originally
tried and convicted of rape).
127. See Pennsylvania Senate Judiciay Committee to Address Rape Law Change, PR
NEwswIRE, June 6, 1994 (revealing that various Pennsylvania senators were urging
Legislature to "act expeditiously to clarify the state's rape statute"). According to
Senator D. Michael Fisher, "[i]f the Legislature needs to spell out in the law that
saying no to a sexual act is enough, then we should do that and do it without
delay." Id. State Representative Karen Ritter, expressed a similar sentiment: "Our
job now is to make clear enough that even judges can understand that if someone
says 'no,' then it's a crime." Flander, supra note 48, at 5.
128. See Moran, supra note 19, at BI (noting that "Republicans and Democrats
accused each other of stalling opposing-party legislation" and particularly noting
that "Democrats accused Republicans of saving the issue for [Governor] Ridge,
while Republicans accused Democrats of maneuvering on behalf of former Rep.
Karen A. Ritter, who for the last few years led House efforts to overhaul statutes
pertaining to rape and other sex crimes"); Eshleman, supra note 19, at BI
("Although lawmakers came up with a bill last year to address the situation, they
chose to hold off on it until Gov. Ridge's special legislative session on crime.").
For a discussion of the legislators' rape reform efforts, see infra notes 129-35.
For a discussion of the bill that was finally signed into law, see infra notes 136-42
and notes 183-206.
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reform.' 29 In the House of Representatives, momentum finally gathered
around a bill that predated the Berkowitz decision and attempted to com-
prehensively overhaul the statutory scheme for rape.1 30 Similarly, the Sen-
ate proposed various bills that were more narrowly tailored to specifically
overrule Berkowitz by making nonconsensual intercourse rape. 3 1 How-
129. For the reaction of various legislators to the Berkowitz decision, see supra
note 127 and accompanying text.
130. See H.B. 160, 178th General Assembly, 1993-94 Sess. (introduced by Rep.
Karen Ritter and others on February 1, 1993) (Printer's No. 4317) [hereinafter
H.B. 160 (Printer's No. 4317)]. This bill represented a comprehensive attempt to
amend the sexual offenses statutory scheme by replacing rape with two separate
crimes, aggravated sexual assault (a first-degree felony retaining forcible compul-
sion and resembling the already existing rape statute) and sexual assault (a second-
degree felony only requiring intercourse without the complainant's consent). Id.;
see also Paul J. Mathison, Editorial Letter: Amend State Rape Law, HARRISBURG PA-
TRIOT, Nov. 18, 1994 (discussing House Bill 160, urging Senate to pass bill and
noting that "the possibility exists that attempts could be made to delay this bill to
achieve partisan gain"). While the bill unanimously passed the House in October,
1994, it did not meet Senate approval. Adam Bell, Ruling Puts Rape Reform Bill on
Lawmakers'Plates, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, December 28, 1994, at B4 (noting that vari-
ous parts of House Bill 160 needed to be "ironed out" and that similar legislation
was likely "to resurface in [Governor] Ridge's crime session" in 1995).
131. See S. 1750, 178th General Assembly, 1993-94 Sess. (Printer's No. 2222)
[hereinafter S. 1750 (Printer's No. 2222)]; S. 533, 178th General Assembly, 1993-
94 Sess. (amended as of June 7, 1994 to address Berkowitz) (Printer's No. 2229)
[hereinafter S. 533 (Printer's No. 2229)].
Senate Bill 1750 retained the forcible compulsion language of Pennsylvania's
existing rape statute, but added a fifth element of non-consent. Compare S. 1750
(Printer's No. 2222) with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1994), as amended
by 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1995). In relevant part, Senate Bill 1750
stated:
A person commits a felony of the first degree when he engages in sexual
intercourse with another person not his spouse:
(1) by forcible compulsion;
(2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a
person of reasonable resolution;
(3) who is unconscious;
(4) who is so mentally deranged or deficient that such person is incapa-
ble of consent; or
(5) without the consent of the other person ....
S. 1750 (Printer's No. 2222). The bill failed to define consent and, ultimately, did
not move beyond the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Senate Bill 533 had a considerably longer life than Senate Bill 1750, but was
amended numerous times. See Bell, supra note 130, at B4 (noting that, ultimately,
Senate unanimously passed S. 533, "Greenleaf's plan"). Initially, in an effort to
directly address the statutory criticisms pointed out by the Berkowitz reaction, the
bill removed the controversial forcible compulsion element entirely, added a con-
sent element and defined consent. See S. 533 (Printer's No. 2229). Senate Bill
533, originally defined rape as follows:
A person commits a felony of the first degree when he engages in sexual
intercourse with another person not his spouse:
(1) without consent of the other person;
(2) who is unconscious;
(3) who is so mentally deranged or deficient that such person is incapa-
ble of consent ....
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ever, both chambers could not agree on any bill.13 2 Therefore, despite
the sense of urgency and outrage created by the supreme court, the legis-
lative session ended in 1994 without a resolution to the Berkowitz
controversy.1 33
With the start of the Special Legislative Session on Crime in 1995,
legislators revived rape reform.134 Again, legislators proposed bills mak-
ing nonconsensual intercourse rape. 13 5 However, with the inactivity of
these bills, it became clear that a compromise would be necessary if rape
reform was to be a reality. Senate Bill 2, which represents such a compro-
mise, received unanimous approval by the House and Senate and was
signed into law on March 31, 1995.136
(C) Consent.-For the purpose of this section, "consent" shall mean
words or overt actions by a person who is competent to give informed
consent indicating freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse.
S. 533 (Printer's No. 2229). By the time the Senate passed Senate Bill 533, it was
virtually unrecognizable from its earlier form. Compare S. 533 (Printer's No. 2229)
with S. 533, 178th General Assembly, 1993-94 Sess. (as amended November 22,
1994) (Printer's No. 2570). In fact, the bill ultimately proposed a more compre-
hensive statutory reform and utilized the two-tier system of aggravated sexual as-
sault (a first-degree felony) and sexual assault (a second-degree felony) that closely
resembled House Bill 160. Compare S. 533, 178th General Assembly, 1993-94 Sess.
(as amended November 22, 1994) (Printer's No. 2570) with H.B. 160 (Printer's
No. 4317) (both utilizing same two-tier system).
132. See Moran, supra note 19, at BI (discussing House and Senate's failure to
agree on any bills during 1994).
133. See Bell, supra note 130, at B4 (discussing Legislature's progress in rape
reform since supreme court's ruling). Expressing disappointment with the Legis-
lature's progress, Kathryn Geller Myers, spokeswoman for the Pennsylvania Coali-
tion Against Rape, said, "I thought this would be the year .... Certainly the
momentum was there. The public outrage was there. But issues are hot one day
and not the next." Id.
134. See Moran, supra note 19, at B1 ("The no-means-no issue was revived this
year as part of the governor's special legislative session on crime.").
135. See, e.g., S. 29, 179th General Assembly, 1995 Spec. Sess. (introduced by
Senators Mellow, O'Pake, Stewart, Stapleton and Bodak on January 24, 1995, and
using the same language as Senate Bill 1750); S. 37, 179th General Assembly, 1995
Spec. Sess. (introduced by Senator Greenleaf on January 24, 1995, and using the
same language as Senate Bill 533). For the language of Senate Bill 29, see S. 1750
(Printer's No. 2222), supra note 131. For the language of Senate Bill 37, see S. 533
(Printer's No. 2229), supra note 131.
136. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101 et seq. (Supp. 1995) (effective May
31, 1995) (formerly S. 2, 179th General Assembly, 1995 Spec. Sess. (introduced by
Senator Greenleaf on January 24, 1995) (Printer's No. 105)); George, supra note
17, at A3 (discussing new law and noting Governor Ridge's endorsement).
Prior to the unanimous approval of the bill, there was some debate over
whether the statute would retain the word "rape" and provide for two separate
first-degree felonies, rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, or whether
the term "aggravated sexual assault" would be used as an "umbrella term" to cover
both rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse in the same statute. Johnna
A. Pro, Senators Rewrite Law on Sexual Assault, Rape, Prr-r. POST-GAZE-rE, March 21,
1995, at B4. Senators opposed the single statute approach using the term "aggra-
vated sexual assault" because they were concerned that judges would impose con-
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Senate Bill 2, now codified, revises the statutory scheme for sexual
crimes in general.13 7 Utilizing a gradation approach, the statute classifies
the sexual crimes for adult offenders and victims as follows: (1) first-de-
gree felonies include rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, (2)
second-degree felonies include sexual assault and aggravated indecent as-
sault, and (3) second-degree misdemeanors include indecent assault and
indecent exposure.' 3 8
Among the new statutory provisions, section 3124.1 entitled "Sexual
Assault," purports to address the Berkowitz decision directly.' 3 9 Hailed in
the press as the "no means no provision," this statute makes nonconsen-
sual intercourse a second-degree felony punishable by a maximum of ten
years imprisonment.1 40 With respect to sentencing and grading of the
crime, this statute is an improvement from the supreme court's approach
that made nonconsensual intercourse a mere second-degree
misdemeanor.14 1
In addition, while the rape statute was the focus of post-Berkowitz pub-
lic outcry, the legislature made only one relevant change to the Berkowitz
issues regarding the crime of rape. The General Assembly added a defini-
tion of forcible compulsion in an attempt to clarify the rape statute which,
even in its "new" form, retains the controversial forcible compulsion
element.' 42
current sentences that would shorten prison terms for sex offenders, instead of
consecutive sentences that would be lengthier. Id. Originally, the Pennsylvania
Coalition Against Rape wanted the rape term removed; however, they changed
their position and supported the Senate version. Id. (acknowledging coalition
spokeswoman Kathryn Geller Myers on change in position).137. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101 et seq. (Supp. 1995) (effective May
31, 1995). Other changes in the statute include definitional clarifications, most
notably the definition of forcible compulsion. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101
(Supp. 1995) (effective May 31, 1995). Additional changes include the removal of
the phrase "alleged victim" and its replacement with the term "complainant," and
various changes with respect to sexual assault and statutory rape, including revised
age provisions. Id.
138. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3121, 3123-27 (Supp. 1995) (effective May
31, 1995).
139. For the text of 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124.1 (Supp. 1995) (effective
May 31, 1995), see supra note 18.
140. For a discussion of the public reaction to section 3124.1, see supra note
19 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the penalty imposed by section
3124.1, see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
141. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1166 (Pa. 1994) (finding
only enough evidence to support indecent assault conviction); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3126 (Supp. 1994) (grading indecent assault as a second-degree misde-
meanor), amended by 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3126 (Supp. 1995).
142. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (Supp. 1995) (effective May 31,
1995). The statute defines forcible compulsion as: "Compulsion by use of physi-
cal, intellectual, moral, emotional or psychological force, either express or im-
plied. The term includes, but is not limited to, compulsion resulting in another
person's death, whether the death occurred before, during or after sexual inter-
course." Id.; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1995) (effective May
31, 1995) (retaining forcible compulsion in definition of rape).
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IV. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION IN BERxOwiTzAND THE LEGISLATURE'S RESPONSE
A. The Weaknesses in the Berkowitz Rationale
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v.
Berkowitz143 contravenes the spirit of rape reform that has shaped the law
throughout the past two decades. Although the court purportedly fol-
lowed the legislature's intent by construing the rape statute in connection
with the indecent assault statute, the court disregarded the legislative in-
tent expressed in another statute, the "resistance not required" statute.
Moreover, the court construed its own precedential cases in such a con-
stricting manner that it revived rape myths and stereotypes that it once
rejected. 144
Although the court initially acknowledged that a rape victim need not
resist, the court effectively ignored this proposition throughout the re-
mainder of its opinion.1 45 In analyzing the facts of the case, the court
emphasized that the victim did not physically resist during her encounter
with Berkowitz. 146 Specifically, the court noted that the defendant's
hands were not restraining the victim in any manner and that the victim
never attempted to leave the room. 147
Under the mandate of the "resistance not required" statute, such fac-
tual observations should be irrelevant to establishing the crime of rape. 14 8
However, the court incorrectly associated lack of resistance with degree of
force by finding that, on the record, the defendant did not use force
against the victim. 1 49 Moreover, the court mistakenly relied on Common-
wealth v. Mlinarich to support its statement that the degree of force used
must be enough to "prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolu-
tion."150 While the plurality opinion in Mlinarich took this approach, the
143. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
144. Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1223 n.11 (Pa. 1986) (re-
jecting rape myths and "ill-conceived" rules perpetuating them). For a discussion
of Rhodes, see supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
145. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1163 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107
(1983) that "[t] he victim of a rape need not resist" and quoting Commonwealth v.
Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1217 (Pa. 1986) that "[tihe force necessary to support a
conviction of rape . . . need only be such as to establish lack of consent and to
induce the [victim] to submit without additional resistance .. " (emphasis added)).
146. Id. at 1164.
147. Id. Moreover, the court pointed out that, in response to defense coun-
sel's question, "Is it possible that [when Appellee lifted your bra and shirt] you
took no physical action to discourage him," the victim answered, "It's possible." Id.
148. See § 3107; Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1227 n.14 ("It is not necessary to prove
that the victim actually resisted in order to prove that the act of sexual intercourse
was against the victim's will and/or without consent.").
149. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164 (concluding that victim's testimony "is devoid
of any statement which clearly or adequately describes the use of force . . . against
her").
150. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988) (plu-
rality opinion)). As a plurality decision, the precedential value of Mlinarich is ques-
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Berkowitz court neglected to mention that the Mlinarich dissenters ex-
pressly disagreed with the assertion that resistance and force are depen-
dent concepts.15 1 Because the opinions of the Mlinarich plurality and
dissenters could not be reconciled on this point, the Berkowitz court's ref-
erence to Mlinarich provided weak support, at best. 15 2
Not only did the Berkowitz court restore the resistance requirement in
proving forcible compulsion, the court also took a narrow view of resist-
ance and force. According to the court, the weight of the defendant's
body pinning the victim and the act of intercourse, despite the victim's
repeated protests, were insufficient to constitute rape by forcible compul-
sion.153 Thus, while physical resistance has an impact on force according
to the Berkowitz court, verbal resistance does not.15" Moreover, in reach-
ing its decision that nonconsensual intercourse is not rape by forcible
tionable. See Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1344 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (acknowledging plurality problem of Mlinarich and refusing to apply
Mlinarich to facts of Berkowitz), aff'd in part & vacated in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa.
1994); Commonwealth v. Ruppert, 579 A.2d 966, 969 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
(rejecting Mlinarich as non-binding precedent and following majority holding in
Rhodes), alloc. denied, 588 A.2d 914 (Pa. 1991); Commonwealth v. Dorman, 547
A.2d 757, 761 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (same), alloc. denied, 571 A.2d 380 (Pa. 1989).
For a discussion of Mlinarich, see supra notes 60-65, 76-77 and accompanying text,
and infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
151. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161; see also Mlinarich, 542 A.2d at 1340 (plurality
opinion). While declaring that the force used in rape must "prevent resistance by
a person of reasonable resolution," the plurality opinion did not go so far as to
reinstate resistance "to the utmost" or "useless resistance which would further im-
peril the victim's safety." Id.
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Larsen, strongly opposed this resist-
ance rationale. According to the dissenting opinion, the plurality opinion
turns around and places the focus of attention in a rape prosecution
squarely back on the victim, only this time that focus is achieved in a
more subtle, but no less pernicious, manner. Instead of requiring the
victim to resist "to the utmost," she is now required to satisfy the court
that she withstood a "prescribed level" of compulsion.
Id. at 1345 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
The dissenters disagreed with the plurality's position that resistance was modi-
fied to adopt an objective requirement that the victim resist as much as a person of
reasonable resolution should have resisted. Id. at 1346. The dissenters strongly
declared that 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107 "does not merely 'modify' the 'de-
gree of resistance requirement in sexual assault cases,' it makes it clear that there is
no such requirement-period!" Id.
152. When the supreme court referred to Mlinarich, it attempted to reconcile
the plurality opinion and the dissenting opinion by arguing that the dissenting
opinion did not take issue with the implicit holding of the plurality opinion, that
something more than lack of consent is required to prove forcible compulsion.
Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164 n.4. Even if this reading of the dissenting opinion is
correct, it does not change the fact that both opinions expressly deal with the
resistance issue and reach opposite conclusions on it. Therefore, it is impossible to
effectively reconcile the plurality and dissenting opinions on the very issue that the
Berkowitz court cites the case to support.
153. Id. at 1164.
154. Id. (declaring fact that victim stated "no" is relevant to issue of consent,
but not to issue of force). But see Henderson, supra note 37, at 65 ("[I] t should go
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compulsion, the court took a narrow view of "force" and exceeded its dis-
cretion in reviewing the evidence.
In contrast to Pennsylvania's highest court, the New Jersey Supreme
Court has broadly interpreted force to include the force inherent in non-
consensual intercourse. 155 While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recog-
nized that the weight of Berkowitz's body pinning the victim during
intercourse constituted some force, the court declared that this was an
insufficient amount of force.' 56 To reach this conclusion, the court ex-
ceeded its standard of review and usurped the function of the jury.157 The
trial record did not reveal the relative weights and sizes of the victim and
defendant, but the jury saw both individuals and concluded that the victim
was forcibly compelled to engage in intercourse with the defendant.' 58
Therefore, the court should not infer that the weight of the defendant was
insufficient force because such an inference contradicts the jury's conclu-
sion.15 9 In an attempt to support its view that forcible compulsion re-
quires more than nonconsensual intercourse, the court examined the
rape statute in light of the indecent assault statute.' 60 The court correctly
acknowledged that indecent assault is" 'indecent contact with another...
without the consent of the other person' " and that rape lacks such a con-
sent element.16 1 Thus, the court concluded that, if the legislature in-
without saying that if a woman does not want to engage in intercourse and is not
consenting, the man 'has to use physical force to accomplish the act.' ").
155. In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1276 (N.J. 1992). Although the New Jersey
statute is not identical to the Pennsylvania statute, both statutes do not consider
resistance or lack of consent to be relevant to rape. Compare 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1994), amended by 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1995)
with N.J. REv. STAT. § 2C:14-3 (1982). Therefore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Berkowitz could have adopted the NewJersey Supreme Court's reasoning that "to
require physical force in addition to that entailed in an act of involuntary or un-
wanted sexual penetration would be fundamentally inconsistent with the legislative
purpose to eliminate any consideration of whether the victim resisted or expressed
non-consent." In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1276. For a further discussion of In re
M.T.S., see supra notes 33, 68 and accompanying text.
156. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164.
157. In reviewing the evidence, the court could only overturn the jury verdict
if, upon accepting all evidence as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the Commonwealth, the jury could not have concluded that the elements
of the crime were met. Id. at 1163.
158. See Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1347 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (noting that "cold record is utterly devoid of any evidence regarding the
respective sizes of either appellant or the victim"), aff'd in part & vacated in part,
641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth's Brief, supra note 67, at 9 (arguing that
jury observed individuals in court and, therefore, was only entity legally competent
to determine significance of defendant's weight on top of victim).
159. Commonwealth's Brief, supra note 67, at 8-10.
160. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164-65.
161. Id. at 1164 (citation omitted) (comparing rape statute with indecent as-
sault statute).
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tended forcible compulsion to be nonconsensual intercourse, the
legislature would have defined rape as intercourse without consent.162
While there is some logic in this statutory construction, the court
failed to recognize that fundamental differences between rape and inde-
cent assault undermine any comparison that can be made between them.
For example, indecent assault is a misdemeanor, while rape is a first-
degree felony.1 63 In addition, rape requires penetration, while indecent
assault does not.164 Because the court ignores this distinction, it makes
penetrating a non-consenting woman, which should be a more serious of-
fense, the equivalent of fondling a woman without her consent, in that
both offenses are second-degree misdemeanors. 165 Furthermore, this
mechanistic approach to statutory construction overlooks the reality faced
by those most affected by the law, the victims.16 6 According to one
scholar, "[T]he harm in rape is nonconsensual intercourse... and that
requiring some form of violence in addition perpetuates a male, rather
than a female interpretation of rape law." 16 7
Finally, the court ignored the spirit of rape reform by construing the
rape statute so narrowly. Rape reform is intended to facilitate meritorious
rape prosecutions and convictions.1 68 However, by constricting the con-
162. Id.
163. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3126(b) (Supp. 1994) (grading indecent as-
sault as misdemeanor), amended by 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3126 (Supp. 1995);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1994) (stating that penalty is reduced from
life to 20 years imprisonment), amended by 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp.
1995); see Siskin, supra note 49, at 534 (arguing that superior court's forcible com-
pulsion holding, which has since been affirmed by supreme court, contradicts leg-
islative intent evinced by classification of rape as felony and indecent assault as
misdemeanor).
164. Siskin, supra note 49, at 534 (describing penetration as fundamental dis-
tinction between two offenses).
165. Id. Because the court declared that nonconsensual intercourse consti-
tutes indecent assault, a second-degree misdemeanor, Berkowitz is serving only a
six to 12 month sentence, rather than a maximum of 20 years that a rape charge
would have carried. Ex-Student, Acquitted of Rape, Now Seruing Assault Sentence, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 3, 1994, at 6.
166. Henderson, supra note 37, at 65 (citing Berkowitz as case that ignores wo-
men's experiences during nonconsensual intercourse).
167. Id. According to Lynne Henderson, professor at Indiana University at
Bloomington School of Law,
The requirement of additional force assumes that lack-of-consent inter-
course itself does not constitute force and pain, which utterly ignores wo-
men's experiences .... And a man's forcing his penis into a woman's
body can be excruciatingly painful. The harm is in the invasion and the
denial of one's existence as a human being, not whether or not there is
additional violence.
Id.
168. For a discussion of traditional rape reform and its impact, see supra notes
34-38 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Pennsylvania's rape reform, see
supra notes 39-79 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Pennsylvania's most
recent rape reform and its impact, see supra notes 18-19 and infra notes 183-206,
213-15 and accompanying text.
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cept of "forcible compulsion," the court undermines meritorious rape
prosecutions and lessens the likelihood of obtaining convictions. 169
The court also ignored a fundamental element of all criminal prose-
cutions, the state of mind of the accused with regard to the victim's lack of
consent. 170 According to basic principles of criminal law, a defendant
should only be guilty of a crime if he acted with "moral reprehensibility,"
meaning that he or she "was aware of the major facts and circumstances
that justify making the conduct criminal."17 1 In upholding the indecent
assault conviction in Berkowitz, the court simply acknowledged that because
the victim "repeatedly said 'no' throughout the encounter ... the jury
reasonably could have inferred that the victim did not consent to the inde-
cent contact."' 72 The court failed to articulate whether the defendant had
to actually know the victim was not consenting or whether a lesser mental
state, such as recklessness or negligence as to the victim's lack of consent,
would suffice for criminal liability.173
Essentially, the defendant's mental state is the crux of the "no means
yes" debate.' 74 Generally, in discussing rape reform, critics pose four al-
ternatives for a defendant's mental state: (1) knowledge or actual aware-
ness, (2) recklessness, (3) negligence or (4) strict liability.175 Under the
first standard, if actual awareness of lack of consent is required, defend-
ants will argue, as Berkowitz attempted, that they believed the victims'
protestations were "thinly veiled acts of encouragement." 176 Such a re-
quirement would completely undermine feminist and rape prevention
169. See Report, supra note 12, at 1-7 (citing Berkowitz as case "that horri[fies]"
and represents "detour on the road to equal justice").
170. See George Dix, Date Rape: Defining When 'No'Means 'No', CONN. L. TRIR.,
Apr. 12, 1993, at 22 (discussing state of mind requirement in criminal prosecu-
tions). According to Dix,
Berkowitz's state of mind should be the focus of attention in his case,
rather than the issues that have pre-occupied the Pennsylvania courts ....
Whether "[putting]" the complainant on the bed or any of the other ac-
tions he took constituted sufficient force beyond what was inherently nec-
essary to accomplish penetration is a quibble over what should be an
irrelevancy.
Id.
171. Dix, supra note 170, at 22. Dix notes that "failure to require awareness of
the complainant's non-consent is likely to violate the due-process requirement that
criminal liability not be outrageously disproportionate to the blameworthiness of
the offender's conduct." Id.
172. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1166 (Pa. 1994).
173. Id.
174. See Henderson, supra note 37, at 63-72 (discussing relevance of defend-
ant's mental state to stereotypical views of females that "no-means-yes" and that
women like to be dominated and overpowered).
175. For a discussion of each of these standards in the context of rape prose-
cutions, see infra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
176. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992),
aff'd in part & vacated in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
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teachings that "no" does, in fact, mean "no."17 7 Some critics believe that
recklessness, which is an awareness of the risk of lack of consent and a
conscious disregard of that risk, would be a more reasonable requirement
for both victims and defendants. 178 Under this formulation, ajury could
conclude that, given a victim's protestations, the defendant was aware of
the likelihood that she was not consenting, but ignored the risk by pro-
ceeding with the act of intercourse. 179 Others support the negligence
standard, which would give victims added protection by imposing criminal
liability on a defendant if the defendant failed to recognize the victim's
lack of consent in a situation where a reasonable person would have recog-
nized it.180 Still others, in an attempt to ensure even greater protection
for victims, advocate strict liability as to lack of consent.18 1 However, by
failing to address any of these alternatives, the court implicitly sustains the
possibility that a victim's protestations could be misinterpreted as encour-
177. For a discussion of rape prevention teaching, see supra notes 48-49 and
accompanying text.
178. See Dix, supra note 170, at 22 (arguing that recklessness is proper stan-
dard and that requiring negligence by "showing that the accused should have been
aware of this risk is too low a threshold in a prosecution for a serious crime"). But
see Henderson, supra note 37, at 65-66 (opposing recklessness standard because
under recklessness standard, "a defendant can successfully argue that he never
'consciously disregarded' the risk of nonconsent").
179. Dix, supra note 170, at 22. In advocating recklessness as the mental state
requirement for rape, Dix noted that, in Bae*ouritz, "[a] jury willing to find that he
[Berkowitz] knew she was non-consenting might well-and properly-be willing
to find that he considered that he might be wrong in thinking she really meant
'yes,' but disregarded that risk and proceeded nevertheless." Id.
180. See ESTRIcH, supra note 9, at 96-98 (arguing that minimum culpable
mental state as to consent should be negligence); Estrich, supra note 72, at 1182-83
(same). For a detailed discussion of the New Jersey Supreme Court's use of the
negligence standard, see supra note 73. However, not all commentators agree with
New Jersey's approach. See Dix, supra note 170, at 22 (rebuking New Jersey
Supreme Court's use of negligence as "too low a threshold").
While agreeing with Estrich that negligence should be the minimum mental
state required, one commentator argues that even negligence is not enough to
protect victims. Henderson, supra note 37, at 67-68. According to Henderson,
"[S]imply using the reasonable man, or the reasonable man in the defendant's
circumstances, standard is not enough to displace the presumption that women
are always and already consenting, lustful creatures, nor does it counteract images
of male persistence and dominance." Id.
181. See Henderson, supra note 37, at 68-72 (arguing that strict liability should
be imposed "as soon as the woman says no or indicates that she does not want to
engage in sexual activity" and discussing advantages of this standard). According
to Henderson,
Once the man is told no, he is alerted to the risk of lack of consent and
should bear the risk if he continues despite the no. No should mean no.
Stop should mean stop. Crying should negate consent. Similarly,
screaming and silence are negations. Further, a woman's lack of positive
cooperation in sexual activity is a signal of nonconsent, not her 'natural'
passivity.
Id. at 68. However, Henderson admits that legislatures would probably not be ea-
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agement and, thereby, perpetuates the "no means yes" stereotype that is so
damaging to victims.
182
B. The Effectiveness of the Legislative Remedy
While the new legislation has received much praise and little criti-
cism, a critical analysis of the legislation indicates that its impact on ex-
isting law may not be as innovative and responsive to Berkowitz as its
advocates suggest.'8 3
While on its face the legislature's gradation approach to sexual crimes
seems innovative and responsive to Berkowitz, even before the supreme
court made its ruling in Berkowitz, the legislature amended the statutory
scheme to add a middle tier, aggravated indecent assault.' 8 4 While this
statute was not applicable to Berkowitz, its enactment suggests that the
legislature was well aware that only two alternatives, rape and indecent
assault, did not provide adequate relief to victims of sexual crimes.
The newly enacted sexual assault statute, which purports to be the
new "middle tier" in the gradation approach, is designed to directly ad-
dress the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling in Berkowitz, by applying to
cases like Berkowitz in which there is no evidence of force or physical resist-
ance.185 Under this statute, the victim's verbal resistance would have been
sufficient to convict Berkowitz of a second-degree felony, rather than a
second-degree misdemeanor. 186 However, this same result could have
182. See Henderson, supra note 37, at 55 (noting that "[a] particular tragedy
of... no means yes stories is not only that passivity means acceptance, but also that
women's assertiveness means acceptance").
183. Rape counselors and legislators have an optimistic view that the new leg-
islation will increase reporting and encourage victims to come forward. See Bar-
rientos & Kadaba, supra note 18, at B1. However, others believe that the new
legislation is "misconceived." Id. According to Philadelphia defense attorney
Michael Mustokoff, who argued the Berkowitz case before the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, "As the law previously existed . . . it took into consideration the
full spectrum of non-consensual sexual activity as opposed to the present statute,
which draws no differentiation between non-consensual sexual activity and rape."
Id.
184. See Editorial: State's Rape Laws Must Change, LANCASTER INTELLIGENCERJ.,
July 8, 1994, at A9 (Letter to the Editor from Thomas R. Caltagirone, Chairman of
House Judiciary Committee). In his letter, Chairman Caltagirone noted that, in
1990, Governor Casey signed into law a bill establishing the crime of aggravated
indecent assault, a second-degree felony. Id. According to Caltagirone, " 'No does
mean no' in this charge. If a Berkowitz-type case happened today, the perpetrator
would face this charge and face stiffer penalties." Id.
Notably, however, at the time Berkowitz was indicted, the statutory scheme for
sexual crimes did not provide for a middle tier. Rather, the two alternatives that
existed and that Berkowitz was charged with were rape, a first-degree felony and
indecent assault, a second-degree misdemeanor. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641
A.2d 1161, 1162 (Pa. 1994).
185. See Barrientos &c Kadaba, supra note 18, at B1 (describing new legisla-
tion). For a further discussion of the features of the sexual assault statute, see
supra notes 18, 139-41 and accompanying text.
186. Id.
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been achieved under the already existing aggravated indecent assault stat-
ute. 187 Moreover, the aggravated indecent assault statute was an even
more comprehensive reform than the new statute, because it applies to a
broader range of cases than the "new" sexual assault statute. 18 8 Aggra-
vated indecent assault encompasses any "penetration, however slight, of
the genitals or anus of another with a part of the actor's body for any
purpose other than good faith hygienic or law enforcement proce-
dures."' 8 9 The "new" sexual assault statute, however, is only applicable to
sexual intercourse.' 9 0 Because this "new" sexual assault statute is so nar-
row, it is already encompassed in the aggravated indecent assault stat-
ute.191 Therefore, this new legislation merely duplicates the already
existing law and is a superfluous addition to an already complex statutory
scheme.
Even if the sexual assault statute is viewed positively, as a more specific
alternative method of conviction than the aggravated indecent assault stat-
ute, the sexual assault statute fails to address issues raised by Berkowitz.192
First, by making a Berkowitz-type situation a second-degree felony, the legis-
lature still refuses to acknowledge that a victim in circumstances resem-
bling the Berkowitz case is a rape victim. Rather, such a victim will be
considered "sexually assaulted" and her assailant will only be subjected to
a punishment that is half as severe as that mandated by a rape convic-
tion.193 Because the legislature denies that a Berkowitz-type situation is
rape, victims may continue to feel betrayed by the justice system and assail-
ants will continue to avoid harsher sentencing. 19 4
Second, although the legislature believes it clarified the definition of
forcible compulsion, it essentially restated the definition that the supreme
187. See Editorial: State's Rape Laws Must Change, supra note 183, at A9 (noting
that aggravated indecent assault statute enacted in 1990 already prevents Berkowitz-
type situation from recurring).
188. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3125 (Supp. 1994) (aggravated indecent
assault), amended by 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3125 (Supp. 1995).
189. Id.
190. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124.1 (Supp. 1995) (effective May 31,
1995).
191. Compare 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3125 (Supp. 1994) (defining aggra-
vated indecent assault), amended by 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3125 (Supp. 1995)
with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124.1 (Supp. 1995) (effective May 31, 1995) (de-
fining sexual assault).
192. For a discussion of the issues in Berkowitz, see supra notes 109-25, 143-82
and accompanying text.
193. Compare 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1995) (effective May 31,
1995) (defining rape as a first-degree felony) with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124.1
(Supp. 1995) (effective May 31, 1995) (defining sexual assault as a second-degree
felony).
194. See Pro, supra note 136, at B4 (recognizing importance of proper termi-
nology for effective judicial interpretation of laws). For a discussion of the psycho-
logical impact laws have on rape victims, see supra notes 9-13 and accompanying
text.
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court initially articulated in Commonwealth v. Rhodes.195 Because the court
in Berkowitz purported to follow the Rhodes definition, the supreme court's
narrow approach to forcible compulsion remains the guiding precedent
and is not overruled by the legislature's mere codification. 196 For in-
stance, because the legislature failed to elaborate what constitutes force
and coercion, the Berkowitz court's proposition that the weight of an assail-
ant's body on a victim does not constitute force, remains the law in Penn-
sylvania. 19 7 Therefore, even with the latest reform, Pennsylvania law is still
not as progressive as the law in other states.
198
Third, because the legislature failed to refine the definition of forci-
ble compulsion, it is still unclear what, if any, impact the circumstances
surrounding an attack will have. For example, in Berkowitz, the court
stressed that because the victim could have easily unlocked the door, she
was not in a coercive environment. 199 Lacking proper legislative gui-
dance, the court's narrow-minded positions on such factors will remain
valid law and will continue to impede rape prosecutions and subject vic-
tims to intense judicial scrutiny.20 0
Fourth, by simply restating the already established definition of forci-
ble compulsion, the legislature also overlooked that the court ignored sec-
tion 3107, the "resistance not required" statute, and stressed that the
victim did not physically resist her attacker.2 0 ' The legislature neither re-
ferred to the already existing section 3107, nor added a new "resistance
not required" element to the rape law. Therefore, because the legislature
failed to explicitly address the resistance issue in the rape context, they
seemingly condoned the court's disregard of the "resistance not required"
statute.
195. For a discussion of the legislature's use of the Rhodes definition of forci-
ble compulsion, see supra note 142 and infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
196. See Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 1994) (pur-
porting to follow Rhodes court's approach to forcible compulsion).
197. Id. at 1164.
198. See In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (1992) (recognizing that weight of assail-
ant's body constitutes sufficient force). For a further discussion of the New Jersey
Supreme Court's approach in M.TS. and a comparison of that approach with the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's position in Berkowitz, see supra notes 155-59 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the more progressive case law of other
states, see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
199. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164 (emphasizing that "the record clearly demon-
strates that the door could be unlocked easily from the inside, that... [the victim]
was aware of this fact, but that she never attempted to go to the door or unlock
it").
200. For a discussion of rape victims' courtroom experiences and the effect of
laws on rape prosecutions, see supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
201. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164 (noting that "[a]ppellee's hands were not
restraining her in any manner during the actual penetration" and that she never
attempted to leave room).
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Finally, like the supreme court, the legislature failed to address the
mental state requirement for lack of consent.2 0 2 Such an omission pro-
vides a glaring loophole for future assailants to argue out of either a rape
or sexual assault conviction.2 03 For instance, an assailant may argue that
despite the victim's verbal or physical protestations, the assailant genuinely
believed the victim was consenting, and therefore, did not have the mens
rea necessary to be convicted of either sexual assault or rape.20 4 Had the
legislature addressed mental state, it could have clearly erected a legal bar
to the use of the "no means yes" stereotype.2 0 5 Instead, through its omis-
sion, the legislature left assailants with a possible defense and left the
courts with the opportunity to judge the validity of these arguments.
Although the new legislation is an improvement from the supreme
court's approach, it is not as comprehensive as its supporters suggest.2 0 6
As future prosecutions reveal the loopholes discussed, the courts will once
again be in the position to effectuate the legislature's reformist intent.
However, if the court should fail again, the legislature will be forced to
confront its own omissions and redraft its legislation.
V. THE SOCIAL AND LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE BE RKowirz DECISION
Unfortunately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court failed to have the
foresight to recognize the impact the Berkowitz decision would have in
both the legal and social realms.20 7 Trials are so taxing on victims that
many women simply would not pursue prosecution if nonconsensual inter-
course was only a misdemeanor.2 08 While working on the legislative rem-
edy, one Pennsylvania senator feared the effect the Berkowitz decision
would have on the prosecution of rape in Pennsylvania: "Victims may now
hesitate to come forward; prosecutors may hesitate to take cases to trial
and juries may hesitate to convict in instances where weapons, violent
struggle and physical injury are not involved. °2 0 9
202. For a discussion of mens rea, see supra notes 170-82 and accompanying
text.
203. See Dix, supra note 170, at 22 (discussing importance of specifying mental
state).
204. Id. (discussing arguments based on lack of mens rea).
205. For a discussion of the "no means yes" stereotype, see Henderson, supra
note 37, at 55.
206. For a discussion of the reaction to Pennsylvania's latest rape reforms, see
supra note 183 and infra note 223 and accompanying text.
207. See Barrientos & Kadaba, supra note 18, at BI (discussing college stu-
dents', rape counselors' and lawyers' reactions to the Berkowitz decision); Myers,
supra note 126, at 1 (discussing impact of the Berkowitz decision).
208. See MADIGAN AND GAMBLE, supra note 13, at 91-107 (discussing impact
trials have on rape survivors); Wicktom, supra note 36, at 400 (finding that inade-
quate definitions of rape contribute to low rates of reporting, arrest and
conviction).
209. Pennsylvania Senate Judiciary Committee to Address Rape Law Change, supra
note 127 (quoting Sen. StewartJ. Greenleaf).
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In addition, the court's emphasis on the victim's lack of resistance in
Berkowitz also raised concerns that victims would have to physically resist
attackers to be able to prosecute rapes successfully.2 10 Such a resistance
requirement would not only revive rape myths that victims must be bat-
tered and bruised to have really been raped, but it could also further jeop-
ardize women's lives during an attack.211 Such effects would undoubtedly
undermine the rape reform goal of preventing a "second-victimization" of
the rape survivor by the judicial system. 2 12
Although many believe the new legislation remedies these judicial ob-
stacles, others still wonder whether the new law "will simply open the door
for legal compromises."2 13 While the new legislation is a step forward,
loopholes like its failure to address mental state and to further define for-
cible compulsion, may also hinder rape reporting and rape prosecu-
tions.2 '1 4 Thus, the same concerns that the Berkowitz decision presented,
are potentially present under the new legislation. 215 However, because
the legislation has not yet been subjected to the 'Judicial test," its true
impact remains unclear.
Despite the new legislation, the Berkowitz decision has already become
infamous nationwide. 216 For instance, a Colorado appellate court has ex-
plicidy rejected the Berkowitz rationale that lack of consent is not relevant
to the issue of force. 217 While the Colorado second-degree sexual assault
210. For a discussion of the reaction to Berkowitz, see supra notes 126-29 and
accompanying text.
211. Many victim advocate groups tell women not to struggle because they
could experience more harm from their attackers. Jack Scherzer & Michael Stetz,
High Court's Rape Ruling Stirs Outrage, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, June 2, 1994, at Al
(quotingJames Gregor, Monroe County District Attorney, discussing harm victims
face when they struggle); SPOHN & Home supra note 34, at 23 (discussing police
and rape counselors' assertions that resistance could increase likelihood of harm
to victim). But see ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 4, at 247-51 (noting that
numerous studies indicate that active resistance by victim is more effective in avoid-
ing rape, but cautioning victims that other factors exist and there is "no magical
formula for avoiding rape").
212. For a discussion of the goals of rape reform and the reform movement's
efforts to avoid putting victims on trial, see supra notes 34-49 and accompanying
text.
213. Barrientos & Kadaba, supra note 18, at B1.
214. For a discussion of the loopholes in the new legislation, see supra notes
183-206 and accompanying text.
215. For a discussion of the issues raised by the Berkowitz decision, see supra
notes 109-25, 143-82 and accompanying text.
216. See Myers, supra note 126, at 1 (discussing nationwide interest in Berkowitz
decision).
217. People v. Schmidt, 885 P.2d 312, 316 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting
Berkowitz expressly and holding that verbal resistance is sufficient for finding that
victim resisted sexual intercourse and that defendant thereafter caused "submis-
sion against the victim's will"), cert. denied, 885 P.2d 312 (Colo. 1994); see also COLO.
REv. STAT. § 18-3-403 (1986) (requiring for second-degree sexual assault penetra-
tion by means "of sufficient consequences reasonably calculated to cause submis-
sion against the victim's will").
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statute does not use the Pennsylvania statute's language of "forcible com-
pulsion ... [or] threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resist-
ance by a person of reasonable resolution," it uses comparable language in
that it requires the perpetrator to cause "submission against the victim's
will."2 1 8 In interpreting the phrase "submission against the victim's will,"
the court expressly rejected Berkowitz and found that the victim's statement
" 'no' provides a sufficient basis upon which ajury could find that a victim
resisted sexual intercourse and that a defendant thereafter caused 'sub-
mission against the victim's will.' ",219
In addition, the nation has also condemned Berkowitz and similar
cases as perpetuating injustice. 22 0 Since 1990, the nation has been investi-
gating rape in the United States.2 2 ' Perhaps federal legislative efforts, in
connection with state efforts, will provide more comprehensive assistance
in preventing Berkowitz-type cases from impeding rape reform.222
Finally, the Berkowitz decision and its legislative progeny have contin-
ued to spark social debate, especially among young men and women. 223
Among the topics brought to the forefront are concerns about dating, the
"no means yes" mentality, the need for communication between men and
women, and the need for all individuals to take responsibility for their
actions.22 4 Thus, while continued legislative efforts on the state and local
level will offer improved legal recourse, these discussions and the en-
hanced understanding that they foster between men and women will pro-
vide the impetus for the social change that is so vital to an effective,
comprehensive rape reform movement.
218. Compare 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1994), amended by 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1995) with COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-403 (1986).
219. Schmidt, 885 P.2d at 316. The court stated, "[W]e reject the rationale of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 537 Pa. 143, 641
A.2d 1161 (1994) ('no' is not relevant to the issue of force). We instead specifi-
cally conclude that a victim's statement of 'no' is relevant to the issue of 'submis-
sion against the victim's will'." Id.
220. For a discussion of the national reaction to Berkowitz, see supra note 126
and accompanying text.
221. For a detailed discussion of the federal government's response to the
problem of rape in the United States, see Hearings, supra note 1, and Report, supra
note 12.
222. See Report, supra note 12, at 14-18 (discussing Violence Against Women
Act of 1993 which seeks to promote national policy on violent crimes against wo-
men and to make recommendations on curbing violence against women).
223. Barrientos & Kadaba, supra note 18, at BI. In a March, 1994 interview,
college students in Pennsylvania hotly debated the Berkowitz case and the new legis-
lation. Id. Many students applaud the new legislative changes, while others point
out that life is not that simple. Id. Many students believe that the new law is "more
than fair" and that it encourages men to be more responsible and mature. Id.
Others fear that the new legislation could be an instrument for disgruntled women
to take revenge on men by retracting their consent after the sexual act was com-
pleted. Id. Still others contend that the new legislation fails to recognize that
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VI. CONCLUSION
Motivated by the public outcry' against Berkowitz, the Pennsylvania
General Assembly recognized that its twenty-two-year-old rape law needed
to be reformed. 225 While the new legislation is encouraging for rape vic-
tims in Pennsylvania, its impact will not be realized until the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court is confronted with cases involving the newly-enacted re-
forms. When addressing such a case, the burden will be on the courts of
this Commonwealth, to effectuate, rather than frustrate, the legislature's
reformist intent. However, regardless of the future of the new legislation,
the Pennsylvania courts, rape victims and rape reform will always be
plagued by the infamy of the Berkowitz decision.
Rosemary J. Scalo
225. For a discussion of Pennsylvania senators' reformist attitudes, see supra
notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
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